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CHAPTER 1: FNTRODUCTION
A major articulation point for scientific discourses within public spaces is the "popular"
scientific text, usually written by professional scientists and intended for consumption by a
non-scientific audience. Some of these scientific discourses make their way into science
fiction texts which expand and elaborate upon them, speculating about their possible effects
in society through the use of individual characters.
Edward O. Wilson, founder of sociobiology (the study of how genetic factors cause and
influence social behavior), has recently written a popular science text. Consilience: The
Unit>' of Knowledge, in which he argues for a return to the tenets of an Enlightenment
epistemology and the values of a materialist/mechanist scientific paradigm. Wilson's
articulation of this specific brand of scientific philosophy demonstrates a deep anxiety and
antipathy towards chaos (entropy and nonlinear chaotic systems) and quantum
indeterminacy, two major sets of discourses endorsed by scientists who advocate a
non-mechanist scientific paradigm. Wilson's text also perpetuates traditional scientific
epistemological metaphors, originating in the writings of Francis Bacon, which emphasize
the distance between the scientific observer and the object observed, the negative
relationship between the two, and the violent, hierarchical nature of scientific objectification.
Other scientists writing popular texts, particularly those interested in quantum mechanics and
chaos theory, have moved away from such traditional notions of scientific philosophy and
epistemology based on the construction of new discourses rooted in twentieth century
physics.
This particular set of contested scientific discourses has been taken up and examined in
the Mars trilogy of science fiction writer Kim Stanley Robinson. I intend to examine how
speculation involving quantum mechanical discourses influences Robinson's
characterization of the subjectivities of two primary figures within his trilogy. I will also
examine ho%v those quantumdiscourses, with their implications about acausalit>' in linear
time and indeterminacy, affect the linear narrative of the trilogy and the body of the text
itself
I will also use Robinson's text, and the conclusions it appears to suggest concerning a
scientific paradigm such as that proposed byWilson, to speculate about the possible
consequences to individuals' lived experiences of a rigidly deterministic and self-declared
"all-(epistemologically)-powerful" mechanist scientific paradigm. Robinson's text explores
the implications of Wilson's ideas through two primary characters: Sax Russell, a scientist in
the Wilsonian mode, and Maya Toitovna, a scientist whose experiential reality and attempts
to order it through her memories vividly highlight the shortcomings ofWilson's arguments
from the point of view of real persons who are comfortable with a chaotic and non-empiricist
reality. Robinson's text creates a discursive space within which the implications ofWilson's
ideas can be explored through comparisons of the experiences ofvarious subjects and their
positions regarding the socially constructed discourses of science.
Ver\' little has been published about the writings of Kim Stanley Robinson, and what has
been published concerning his work focuses primarily upon the Utopian themes ofmany of
his novels and stories (see, for example, the articles ofMoylan, and Ffanko). . Robert
Markley's is the only article I have come across which deals with Robinson's Mars trilogy,
but he chooses to focus on Robinson's concept of the "future primitive" (mixing
contemporary technology with sociobiologically determined Paleolithic behaviors in human
life) and its use as a strategy for an ecologically-friendly human social order. 1have not been
able to discover any articles or other sources concerning Robinson's use of scientific
discourses within his work.
Many of the arguments I use in this paper arise out ofvarious critiques of scientific
methodology, philosophy, and epistemology made by two major (often overlapping)
communities of thinkers, namely poststructuralists and feminists. These two communities,
while having some theoretical suppositions incommon, also have major differences. My
thoughts and attitudes concerning the utility of poststructuralist theory have been strongly
influenced by feminist and postcolonial critiques of the extreme forms of poststructuralism.
Chief among these critiques is the strong silencing effectpoststructuralist theory has upon
certain groups of individuals marked as "different" by the powerstructure inWestern
cultures (for example, African-Americans, women, "Third World" citizens). Once a
coherent self capable of speakingon its ownbehalf has been erased, as extreme
poststructuralist theories of identity would have it, it becomes impossible for these
disadvantaged groups to layclaim to a coherent identity which can voice theirconcerns.
Identity politics recedes as a concern inconditions where there is no identity, andoppressive
power effects are stil! felt by individuals marked as different.
Chela Sandoval, for this very reason, argues for a "theoryand methodof oppositional
consciousness." This theorywouldallow individuals and groups to selectively lay claim to
certain definitions and characteristics of fluid identities depending on the tactical necessity
of the context and opponents within and against which the individual or group is struggling.
Other critics, such as Linda Martin Alcoff, argue, along similar lines, that context has an
impact on the validity of truth claims and that certain claimsmust be taken as "true" in
certain localities (social and physical). Finally, many critics emphasize the role power
structures play in creating "truths" in local contexts (though these local truths are often
defined by the power structures as global truths). In such contexts it is important to be able
to argue within or manipulate the truth claims set forward by the power structure (see, for
example, 6 Tuathail's introduction for a detailed discussion of the construction of
"geographical" truths by imperialist power structures).
I intend to make an argument concerning Edward O. Wilson's philosophy and
epistemology of science using the truth claims of the discipline ofquantum mechanics as
well as its modes and terms of discourse as espoused by physicists in texts intended for a
general readership. What authors like Paul Davies and John Gribbin attempt to do is
describe the "truth" ofreality to the general public, as revealed in the local context ofour
planetarv- environment through mathematical and scientific discourses. Similarly. Wilson's
text is meant for a general readership and claims to be revealing local truth (though Wilson
would claim it to be global truth). While 1am familiar with the epistemological problems
related to truth claims, I wish to enter into a dialogue with Wilson onwhat he considers to be
his own discursive turf, with the assumption that the scientific establishment is a major
power structure which determines local truth (and argues convincingly for that truth s
validity) andmust be engaged at leastpartially on its own terms.
Ihave been heavily influenced in my attitudes on this method of scientific critique by
feminist criticisms of scientific methodology and epistemology. An excellent overview of
such criticism isEvelyn Fox Keller's "Feminism and Science" (originally published in 1982)
in which she examines the wide range of feminist critiques, attempts to classify them on a
spectrum from "moderate" to "radical," and argues for the benefit to science if it attended to
these critiques and modified its praxis and philosophy accordingly. The validity (and value)
of such critiques ofscience from the epistemological positions of"different" subjectivities,
both from within and without the discursive framework of the "mechanistic" paradigm, is
asserted by Robinson's text. Sax Russell's scientific praxis is improved upon, and his
"model" of reality made more accurate when he fully integrates what he learns concerning
indeterminacy andchaos into them. Keller, however, understands that there is danger
involved incritiquing science, and she lays out what isat stake for herpersonally in the very
beginning ofthe article. "As both a feminist and a scientist, I am more familiar than Imight
wish with the nervousness and defensiveness that. .. [the] potential conflict [between
feminism and science] evokes. As scientists we have very real difficulties inthinking about
the kinds of issues that, as feminists, wehave beenraising" (Keller, "Feminism andScience"
28). This admission of unease reveals what is at stake for those who wish to critique the
dominant discursive definitions of truth, but who also desire to continue working within
those discursive frameworks
Donna J. Haraway's articles critiquing the assumptions of various forms of twentieth
centur>' biology and primate studies also fit into this genre of feminist critiques of science
undertaken by scientists. Of primary influence to the arguments I make in this paper are the
first two parts of her book Simians. Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention ofNature,
especially chapter 2, "The Past is the Contested Zone: Human Nature and Theories of
Production and Reproduction in Primate Behaviour Studies," in which Haraway examines
how cultural attitudes held by primatologists in the middle decades of this century influenced
the conclusions they drew from field research into primate reproduction. This line of inquiry-
is important because it demonstrates how "experience," whether in "culture" or "nature,"
tends to influence supposedly "objective" scientific research and thinking. Edward 0.
Wilson, as I will describe in the next chapter, seems to be blissfully unaware of how cultural
assumptions make their way unexamined into his scientific philosophy and epistemolog)-.
This characteristic ofWilson's past work is a favorite theme of research by feminist critics of
science, especially Haraway's chapter 3, "The Biological Enterprise: Sex, Mind, and Profit
from Human Engineering to Sociobiology." In this chapter, Haraway studies how the
discipline of biology has attempted to control its subjects (human organisms in particular) by
imposing differing sets ofmetaphorical characteristics onto those subjects. In the latter half
of this chapter, Haraway examines sociobiology (Wilson's brainchild) and how its metaphors
adhere closely to advanced capitalist strategies for controlling information and profit. This
desire for "control" on the part of science, which necessitates the denial of agency to human
subjects (and the denial, on the part of mechanists such as Wilson, of the existence of
indeterminacy and chaos in "reality"), is one of the areas most severely criticized by
Robinson's Mars trilogy.
Critiquing the metaphors scientists use has been an especially fruitful occupation for
feminist critics. I have been especially influenced by Genevieve Lloyd's "Reason, Science
and the Domination of Matter." in which she describes the long tradition in Western
philosophy of seeing human Culture (gendered male) in opposition to Nature (gendered
female) and, especially in the writings and metaphors of Francis Bacon, of desiring the
control and subjugation of the female in the name of knowledge. Mary Jacobus's article. "In
Parenthesis: Immaculate Conceptions and Feminine Desire," examines how cultural
assumptions influence the expectations scientists bring into the lab and the metaphors they
use in describing their results (in this particular article Jacobus examines accounts of
conception in human reproduction).
Particularly influential to my thoughts about how late twentieth centur\' scientific
discourse has organized itself through metaphorical structures shared in common with other
areas ofWestern culture is Evelyn Fox Keller's book Refiguring Life: Metaphors of
Twentieth-Century Biology. Especially enlightening is the third section of Keller's book,
"The Body of a New Machine: Situating the Organism Between Telegraphs and Computers."
in which she examines the impact of cybernetics and information theory on scientific
metaphors of networks, genetics as information flow, and organisms conceived as cybernetic
systems.
Finally, I have been influenced to a smaller extent by nonpoststructuralist and nonfeminist
critiques of science originating from scientific practitioners. Two volumes have been critical
in demonstrating the usefulness of scientific critiques of science: Lyall Watson's The Dreams
ofDragons: Riddles ofNatural History, and Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall's The Quantum
Society: Mind. Physics, and a New Social Vision. Watson's volume describes several
puzzles that numerous scientific experiments and discoveries have uncovered which have
never been followed up by later scientists and thus remain "unsolved." Some of these
discoveries have been ignored because the dominant paradigm of the time could not account
for them and they were deemed "anomalous," "impossible" or 'irrelevant." Watson argues
convincingly that these experiments should be pursued to a conclusion in the interests of
increasing scientific knowledge about reality. By highlighting some shortcomings of the
scientific process (especially how it deals with "strange" or "unknown" phenomena) Watson
shows that it is possible to develop a more realistic and comprehensive scientific paradigm
which takes into account the indeterminacy inherent in the "natural" world. Furthermore,
Watson, by making this critique from within the discourses of science, shows the possibility
of creating (and critiquing) the dominant scientific discourses from within. Especially
relevant to the present study are Watson's chapters 4, 5 and 9. Chapter 4, "The Nature of
Crowds," concerns crowd behavior and its evident emergent properties which are separate
and greater than the properties of the individuals composing the crowd. In chapter 5, "The
Source ofConcern," Watson describes the spontaneous appearance of crystallized glycerin
when all attempts to manufacture this form of the substance had failed, and the glycerin
crystals' apparent ability to crystallize entirely separate and sealed samples ofglycerin at
great distances. Chapter 9, "The Wonder ofWater," describes several mysterious physical
properties of water which have never been explained or followed up by science.
Zohar and Marshall focus to a large extent on the reluctance many nelirologists display
toward considering the phenomenon of mind as an emergent quantum system. They argue
that this tendency is a remnant of the mechanistic paradigm ofmind and nature (the
paradigm I would argue Wilson subscribes to) which has come under increasing attack in the
sciences over the past several decades thanks to the influence of findings in the discipline of
quantum mechanics. Their work has demonstrated to me the sharp divide still existing
between "mechanists" and adherents to the "quantum" paradigm, both groups considering
themselves to be "scientists."
Many of the critiques I have discussed above focus on the biological sciences as it is
easier to locate and understand cultural influences upon scientific praxis in biological
disciplines than in the "harder" sciences such as chemistrv' and physics. Keller's work is an
exception to this rule, as she tackles concepts from physics, such as entropy and "Maxwell's
demon." in Refiguring Life. In this project, 1do not criticize quantum mechanics as a
culturally-produced set of discourses. However, I do think some future work could be done
in this direction as I feel that the appearance of quantum mechanics as a discipline smack in
the middle of the set of cultural anxieties about subjectivity, truth and progress we have
labeled "modernism," is quite intriguing, especially as quantum mechanics is vitally
interested in these same issues. However, in this paper I am primarily interested in critiquing
how scientists ofWilson's stripe choose to deal with the indeterminacy and uncertainty of
the "hard science" of quantum physics by simply ignoring their implications in the name of
science in general.
Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars trilogy explores the effects of such a move by depicting the
struggles of Sax Russell, a very Wilsonian type of scientist, to first deny indeterminacy and
chaos in reality as he interacts with it, and then to come to grips with quantum phenomena
after he is forced by his research and his experiences to accept such phenomena as integral to
human lives. Robinson's text also explores the lack of relevance of an epistemology, such as
Wilson's; which denies chaos and indeterminacy in favor of an overly-ordered conception of
reality. Maya Toitovna's thoughts and experiences in the many realms of her subjectivities
allow Robinson's text to discover the problems inherent in either a too-orderly or
too-indeterminate conceptualization of reality, and to argue instead for a full acceptance of
the implications of the quantum paradigm for human life and political agency.
CHAPTER 2: THE "UNPREDICTABILITY OF NATURE;"
SCIENCE AS A TECHNOLOGY FOR ORDERING REALITY
"Science." far from being a monolithic entit\', is a discursively constructed set of beliefs
and practiceswhosemeaning(s) depend heavily on the context(s) (spatial, temporal,
discursive, and combinations of any and all of these) within which its articulators operate. It
follows that if "science" is constructed by individuals or groups of individuals operating in
various contexts with differing goals and notions of "truth." then "science" becomes the site
(essentially, considering its size, a metadiscursive site containing many branches of
discourse) for a contest between these competing individuals andgroups for the power to
impose truth-claims on the site as a whole.
In a very general way, some of these conflicts can beunderstood mtheir temporal and
discursive contexts using Thomas Kuhn'smodel of scientific paradigms (seeKuhn).
According to thismodel, as time goes on, science acquires more andmore knowledge. At
certain periods some of the knowledge acquired begins tocontradict assumptions of the
current scientific discourses causing a re-evaluation of those discourses and the eventual
emergence of a new "truth," a new paradigmwhich exists until the situation (called a
"paradigm-shift") occurs againand another paradigm assumes the authority of "truth."
During historical moments of "paradigm-shift," Kuhn observes that the scientific community
as a whole is generally split into two groups, those who wish to continue to hold onto the old
paradigm andthose who wish to embrace the new. Eventually as scientifically acceptable
evidence in favor of the newparadigm continues to grow, thenumber of scientists holding to
the older paradigm diminishes until the new paradigm is essentially universally held to be
"true." This process often takes several decades to run its course.
The twentieth century has been the temporal site for just such a discursive paradigm shift
arising in physics. The influenceof physics as a discipline over the wholescientific
discursive hierarchy is acknowledged bymany scientists, including non-physicists, based on
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the effectiveness of the mathematical models used in physics to describe realit\- (see Wilson
66-71). The paradigm-shift in physics began with the publication of Albert Einstein's
Special Theon.- of Relativity in 1905 which, among other things, eliminated the need for
"ether" as a medium for the transmission of light and other forces through space. The
catalyst for a complete shift from Newtonian mechanistic conceptions of the interaction of
objects and the effects of gravity came with Einstein's General Theory ofRelativity in 1915.
in which Einstein declared that there is no such thing as the absolute space required in
Newton's paradigm within which objects are placed and which serves as a frame for the
objects' interactions with each other. Einstein "proved" that space is in fact curved by
gravity, that space itself is acted upon by the objects which constitute it.
A few years later, beginning in the 1920s, a group of physicists delivered another blow to
the old comfortable Newtonian mechanistic paradigmby demonstrating through laboratory
experiments that at subatomic levels of reality objects do not behave in the ways predicted by
Newton. More disturbing to those scientists who wished to retain the mechanistic
paradigm's dominance was the causative role played by the observer in quantum-level
experiments. Newtonian rules for simple cause-and-effect did not, in fact, appear to have
any truth value at the most basic levels of reality.
Despite the many decades that have elapsed since the publication of the data from the
first relativistic and quantum experiments, and the growingamount of fiirther evidence
supporting the new paradigm in physics, the full paradigm-shifthas yet to work itself out.
Part of the difficulty of this particular paradigm-shift is in the inability ofmost scientists to
stomach the philosophical implications of quantummechanics. If the vast portion of reality
is affected and shaped by the subjectivity of the observer, how is it possibleto constructa
scientifically "objective" model of reality which incorporates the totality of that reality? The
added problemof multiple subjectivities inserts a disturbing amount of indeterminacy into
scientific discourses which previous scientific paradigmsdid not have to account for. The
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temptation for most scientists is to resist the implications of indeterminacy (and the separate
but related problem of nonlinear, or chaotic, systems) in the name of having some sort of
common space and determined order within which to continue to articulate discourses of
objectivity.
1am primarily interested in a subgenre (perhaps even a sub-subgenre) of scientific
discourse, namely scientific texts written by scientists for a nonscientific audience. Within
scientific circles (as Robinson's character Sax Russell notes; Blue Mars 580) this subgenre is
not considered as accurate as literature published in peer-reviewed journals, primarilv
because populartexts resort to "linguistic" descriptions of phenomena (i.e., words) instead of
the more precise linguistic system ofmathematics. However, scientists who write popular
accounts of scientific work seem to do so with the primary intention of educating thegeneral
public about the state of scientific knowledge at themoment of publication. Thus I believe
most scientists would admit that these texts form a bridgebetween scientists, with their
arcane mathematical terminology, and the general public which is not conversant with that
terminology. In other words, popular scientific texts articulate scientific discourses within a
more public space than the '"sciences."
In this chapter I intend to examine and briefly critique Edward O. Wilson's conception of
science and its function, tenets of which are shared in common with Wilson by one of
Robinson's scientist-protagonists Sax Russell. This scientific philosophy iselaborated in
Wilson's book Consilience: The Unitv ofKnowledge (1998), a text intended for a general
readership interested in learning how the sciences can beused to bring all disciplines, from
the social sciences to religion and ethics, into a fully comprehensive and coherent
("consilient" in Wilson's terminology) mechanistic-scientific paradigm. As a part ofmy
critique ofWilson's text, I will occasionally draw upon two other scientific texts intended for
popular consumption; The Matter Myth: Dramatic Discoveries That Challenge Our
Understanding ofPhysical Reality (1992) byphysicists Paul Davies and John Gribbin, and
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The Quantum Socien': Mind. Physics, and a New Social Vision (1994) bv Danah Zohar and
IanMarshall (Marshall is a psychiatrist who has done research on a possible quantum basis
for human consciousness: Zohar. Marshall's wife, is a son of "quantum philosopher" who
specializes in theorizing howquantum mechanical principles might be applied to individual
and social life). The latter two texts enthusiastically embrace the quantum paradigm of
realit)' and, in their respective idiosyncratic ways, explore the implications of quantum and
related phenomena in the authors' particular areas of interest (physics and neurolog\'). areas
which Robinson's character Sax Russell becomes interested in and is therefore forced to
\\Testle with these same issues of quantum indeterminacy and chaotic systems. Wilson's
text, although not explicitly stating his allegiance to themechanistic paradigm, refuses to
deal with quantum mechanics and chaos theon' at all, with a few exceptions which 1will
discuss in a moment. I intend to speculate about this omission in Wilson's text, specifically
what that omission says about Wilson's desire to construct and maintain a hyperordered
reahtN'. ! shall then briefly address the implications of some ofWilson's descriptive
metaphors concerning science.
Aquick glance through Wilson's index goes a long way toward identifying his attitudes
toward quantum indeterminacy and chaos. There is no entry for "quantum mechanics,"
although there are two textual references listed for "quantum electrod>'namics (Q.E.D.)"
(Wilson 330), the branch of quantum mechanics which aims at unify'ing all the forces in
nature into one grand theory. There is also no listing for "indeterminacy," and the only
listing for "chance" has the additional label "in history" (Wilson 324). The index's entn' for
"chaos theory" directs the reader to "see complexity theory," which Wilson spends a
relatively large amount of space critiquing. Theodd thing about his conflation of "chaos
theory'" and "complexit>' theory" isthat, while chaos theory isgenerally applicable to
compIexit>' theor>', thetwo are by no means the same thing. According toWilson, the
scientists working the most strenuously oncomplexity theory apparently believe that the
complex, nonlinear systems they studycan one day be reduced to several interlocking,
comprehensive rules (see Wilson 87-95), while scientists and mathematicians working on
chaos lheor>' are generallyskeptical that science will ever be able to generalize laws that
apply to strictly nonlinear systems (see Davies andGribbin passim, but especially 30-62).
In short. Wilson essentially ignores quantum indeterminacy and chaotic systems in his
index and text, much as Sax Russell does in his scientific work and theorizing. The one
exception inWilson's case, "quantumelectrodynamics," becomes, in Wilson's text, an
example of how successful contemporary scientists are at fitting the universe into their
paradigm. While Wilson acknowledges that "Q.E.D. treats the position andmomentum of
each electron as both a wave function and a discrete particle in space," and further that
electrons"randomly emit.. . and reabsorb . .. photons*' (Wilson 49), neither the inherent
indeterminacy of the electrons, nor the randomness of their photon emission and
reabsorption figure in his text at all. Wilson instead emphasizes that "[i]n one properrv of
the electron, themagnetic moment, theory andexperiment have been matched to themost
extreme degree ever achieved in the physical sciences" (Wilson, 49). In other words the first
two properties hegives for theelectron and all themethodological problems they raise are
ignored in favor of the one property which fits most snugly into the pre-existing scientific
paradigm of reality (though hedoes note that the results of this quantum theory have "small
deviations from the [results] previously predicted by classical atomic theory" [Wilson 50]).
Wilson even invokes the "scientist as hero" narrative (a narrative often referenced in
Robinson s text) through ametaphoric analogy in order to demonstrate how impressive an
achievement this prediction is. "Their [the experimenters] datamatched the theoretical
prediction toone part ina hundred billion. Together the theoretical and experimental
physicists accomplished the equivalent of launching a needle due east from San Francisco
and correctly calling inadvance where itwould strike (near Washington D.C.) towithin the
width of a human hair" (Wilson 50).
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This pattern of thought (shared by Sax Russell through most of theMm trilogy), explicit
mentionof indeterminacy and then the immediate repression of it, also mark the one point in
Wilson's text where "quantum mechanics'* is mentioned (while being repressed in the
index). Wilson writes, "The ruling talismans of twentieth-century science, relativity and
quantum mechanics, have become the ultimate in strangeness to the human mind. ... The
cost of scientific advance is the humbling recognition that reality was not constructed to be
easily grasped by the human mind" (Wilson 31). Having brought up the "strangeness" of
these branches of science, Wilson immediately dismisses them from the text and never
mentions them again. As I will describe in the next chapter Sax Russell, when he realizes he
will be forced to deal with quantum phenomena in his work, also admits the basic
"strangeness" of those phenomena, and succeeds in repressing that strangeness for a short
time. Wilson, in reaction to quantum strangeness, insists in contradictory ways on the
essential orderliness of reality (order either "natural" or "created by science" depending on
what his argument calls for at the particular moment) and the capability of science to correct
the problems with human perception and epistemology that make relativistic and quantum
phenomena so "strange." Sax Russel! is also vitally concerned with proving the solidity of
scientific techniques for ordering a seemingly random and indeterminate reality.
Wilson's project of "consilience," the linking of all branches of human knowledge by
fact-based scientific laws, depends on science's ability to build a rigid, ordered model of
realit>'. ^'[The enterprise of consilience] promises that order, not chaos, lies beyond the
horizon" (Wilson 13). With this statement, early in his argument, Wilson declares science's
antagonism to chaos. Yet Wilson seems unable to articulate just what is chaotic, or where
the chaos is created and where it exists. For the most part, he chooses to blame the apparent
chaotic nature of reality on two sources, a human sensory system and brain that were not
evolved to understand how the universe works, and on "postmodernists" who,- by their
insistence upon the inherent fractured and subjective nature of reality, foment chaos where
none previously existed. Wilson describes the concerns of contemporary scientific
epistemologv': "Can we devise a universal litmus test for scientific statements and with it
eventually obtain the grail of objective truth? Current opinion holds that we cannot and
never will. Scientists and philosophers have largely abandoned the search for absolute
objectivity and are content to ply their trade elsewhere." Wilson continues, "I think
otherwise and will risk heresy; The answer could well be yes" (Wilson 60).
Wilson surmises that the "alignment of outer existence with its inner representation has
been distorted by the idiosyncrasies of human evolution" (Wilson, 61); that is, the human
brain cannot fully experience reality as it really is and thus has a false or incomplete
representation of this reality. Up to this point, Wilson would be in partial agreement with his
dreaded "postmodernists" on the idea that reality, as humans experience it, is a heavily
subjective affair (although he would still insist that everyone experiences that reality in the
same way because we are all humans with human brains and thus have consciousnesses
controlled by sensory functions hardwired into the brain). He quickly parts company with
'"postmodernists" one sentence later by declaring, ''[t]he proper task ofscientisis is lo
diagnose and correct the misalignment [of outer existence with its inner representation]....
No one should suppose that objective truth is impossible to attain, even when the most
committed philosophers urge us to acknowledge that incapacity. In particular it is too early
for scientists, the foot soldiers of epistemology, to yield ground so vital to their mission"
(Wilson 61, his emphasis) (the last sentence is typical of the hyperbole Wilson engages in
while describing the scientific "mission;" I will discuss his particular fondness for violent
and colonialist analogies in a moment).
Sax Russell differs slightly from Wilson on this particular subject, a difference that
allows Russell to expand his theoretical and experiential frameworks to encompass the
implications of indeterminacy and chaos in life in ways which Wilson never could. Where
Wilson takes great pains to separate scientific epistemologyfrom subjective experiential
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realit>\ Sax Russell gradually becomes more and more immersed in his own present
experience throughout the course of the trilogy. After observing how people {mostly
women) around him integrate the indeterminacy of experience into their conceptual
paradigms, he becomes able to do so himself He comes to recognize that "science" is
merely a model of reality which should not necessarily always be given primacy over an
epistemolog>' grounded in lived experience.
Wilson proposes that "objective truth might be obtainable through empirical
investigation" (Wilson 60); however by arguing this, in light of his belief in the false ''inner
representation" of reality, he ends up not proposing any solution at all to the problem of
human subjectivity and epistemology. Since all of"outer existence," including any
"empirical investigation" undertaken, must be filtered through the human sensorv- apparatus
and brain, the same misalignment Wilson sees between "outer" and "inner" appliesjust as
much to scientific experiments, mathematics, and peer reviewed journals as.it does to the
"strangeness" ofquantum indeterminacy or the apparent chaos the human brain perceives in
the universe. Yet the text, to benefitthe broadargument beingmade, must fight, like the
"foot soldiers of epistemology," for the scientist'sability to find an orderly "objective truth,"
in spite of human intelligence.
Concerning "postmodernists" and theirphilosophies, Wilson summarily declares, "[t]he
ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in philosophy are not reflections of
the real world but artifacts of scholarship" (Wilson 8). Thus, the real wodd is quite orderiy
and determinate,while the chaos arises out of "scholarship"(Wilson does not reveal whether
this scholarship is influenced by themisalignment caused by the human brain, but
considering his professed views of "postmodernists," their epistemological problems would
not seem to be of the same nature or caliber as those experienced byscientists). He explains,
"[T]here have always been two kinds oforiginal thinkers, those who upon viewing disorder
try to createorder, and thosewho upon encountering ordertry to protest it by creating
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disorder. . . . And in the Darwinian contest of ideas, order always wins,
because-simply—that is the way the real world works" (Wilson 43-44). Note that the last
sentence asserts, first, the metaphor, taken literally, of an evolutionary drive inherent in
information: and, second, simply ignores, or represses, the scientifically validated concept of
entropy, that is, the always increasing amount of randomness in the universe, in Wilson's
view scientists, creating "order" from "disorder," will inevitably triumph against the
"postmodernists" who create chaos. They will '"win" because the world is an orderly place,
thus ensuring that those who most rigidly and mimetically determine "reality" will come out
on top in the "survival of the fittest" battle Wilson posits as the state of scholarship in the
world today. As I will describe in the chapter concerned with Maya Toitovna, however,
Robinson's text integrates quantum discourses with poststructuralist discourses concerning
human identity to give greater depth to the latter. Robinson's text, far from scorning
"postmodernists" and their concerns, and separating those concerns from "science." views
the two discursive frameworks as deeply interconnected.
"Postmodernists," Wilson declares fervently, are a '"rebel crew milling beneath the black
flag ofanarchy, challeng[ing] the very foundations of science and traditional [i.e..
Enlightenment] philosophy" (Wilson 40). What makes Wilson's demonization of
"postmodernists" ironic is his unconscious reliance upon the quintessential postmodernist
metaphor, that of the "network" (see Keller, Refiguring Life). The primary example of this
metaphor within Wilson's text is his enthusiastic description of the "state of the art
approach" to biological systems "conceived as genetic networks" (Wilson 92). His example
of this line of thought is a quote from William Loomis and Paul Stemberg filled with
examples of the metaphor of "networks" as applied to genetics ("The nodes of such networks
are genes.... The connections are the regulatory and physical interactions among the
RNAs, proteins, and cis-regulatoryDNA sequences of each gene" [quoted in Wilson 92]),
and the further metaphorical assertion that the network functions as a way to control, process
and transmit mformation (the geneticist should "link the genes and their products mto
functional pathways, circuits, and networks" that "implement. . digital logic, analog-digital
conversions, cross-talk and insulation, and signal integration" [quoted in Wilson 92]). This
obsession with networks and information is acharacteristic, according to Haraway, ot
postmodern science (see Haraway). It seems likely that Wilson is not aware of the
metaphors he uses in his scientific work (metaphors which, as feminist critics of science
point out, many other scientists use as well) and/or he is not informed enough on the subject
of postmodemism/poststructuralism to comment knowledgeably on it mrelation to science.
Wilson's determined adherence to order causes his text to contradict itself in a puzzling
way about the "orderly" nature of reality. Late in his book, Wilson writes, "The flaw [in the
predictions of population geneticists] is not in the internal logic of the theory but in the
unpredictability of nature itself^ (Wilson 201). Is nature '^orderly" or is it "unpredictable?"
Are humans" inner representations ("theories"*) of outer nature "misaligned or not? This
point in the text reveals aleakage of the "scientist as hero metaphor, in which the scientist
must "create order *so as tomake sense ofan"unpredictable universe. The text has
repressed any epistemological problems it might have expressed earlier in favor ofthe
inherent "orderliness'' of the scientific project in the face ofa terrifying, deeply repressed
"unpredictable" reality. This avoidance of"chaos" and "indeterminacy" also leads to
overgeneralizations inthe text. For instance, "The dominating influence that spawned the
arts was the need to impose order on theconfusion caused by intelligence" (Wilson 225).
Evidently Wilson would notcharacterize as "art" the products of composers such as John
Cage, visual artists such asJackson Pollack, orwriters such asWilliam S. Burroughs, who ail
enthusiastically embraced a certain amount of indeterminacy and/or chaos in thecreation of
their work.
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Another move toward order which Wilson makes in his text is his faith in the mechanistic
paradigm and its ability, through reductionism, to explain and recreate complex and/or
nonlinear systems in a linear manner.
[Biologists] have refined reductionism into ahigh art and begun to achieve partial
syntheses at the level of the molecule and organelle [i.e., used the knowledge gained
through reductionism to reconstruct the objects under study]. Even ifcomplete cells
and organisms are still beyond them, they know they can reconstruct .some of the
elements one ata time An organism is amachine [and thus capable ofsynthesis
as the sum of its parts]. (Wilson 91, my emphasis)
Thus, even the creation ofliving organisms, the most complex systems in the universe, can
be accomplished by science once it knows how to construct all of the parts that make up
those organisms. However, in order to argue this point, in order to order scientific
knowledge about complex systems, Wilson must ignore the temporal in his model ofthose
systems, a problem Sax faces in his work on quantum memory in human beings. Scientists
must literally "freeze'' each part ofthe system in time, take it out of its context, in order to
treat it as a "part" ina "machine." Ifcomplex systems such as organisms were truly
mechanical thiswould possibly work; however, one of the factors contributing to the
complexity (and chaos) of living organisms, is their tendency tooperate, and change, within
time. Many of these operations and changes occur ona quantum (and possibly smaller) level
within the system and are thus subject to indeterminacy and random effects which a simple
knowledge of the "parts" will never be ableto adequately account for or reproduce. This is
especially significant if, as Zohar and Marshall argue, the brain is an emergent quantum
system whose whole is greaterthan the sumof its parts (seeZoharandMarshall 68-77). Of
mechanism in general,Zohar andMarshall write,"In science,... mechanism has long since
had its day. Newton's strict determinist laws still apply within a narrow spectrum of physical
reality but theyare no longer at the cutting edge of physical thinking" (Zohar andMarshall
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27-28). Mechanism, while not capable of accounting for quantum levels of realit>-. has to be
used by Wilson in order to uphold his faith in the orderly nature of reality and of science.
Other scientists, in contrast to Wilson and the Sax Russell portrayed through the majorm-
of Robinson's trilogy, are enthusiastic about, and fully accept the implications of, quantum
indeterminacy and chaos. Physicists Paul Davies and John Gribbinwrite that "[mechanism].
. . is [a] myth . . . that is being laid [to rest] as we move into the twenty-first century" (Davies
and Gribbin 8). They also assert that at the subatomic level there are no "parts" for science
to use to take apart or build objects and systems.
The founders of quantummechanics .. . argued that whenwe talk of atoms, electrons,
and so on we must not fall into the trap of imagining them as little "things," existing
independently in their own right Use of the word"atom" is just an informal way
of talking about [a mathematical] algorithm. It is a helpful means of encapsulating
that abstract concept in physical language, but that does not mean that the atom is
actually there as a well defined entity with a complete set of physical attributes of its
own, such as a definite location in space and a definite velocity through space.
Heisenberg's own words are revealing in this context: "In the experiments about
atomic events we have to do with things and facts, phenomena which are just as real as
any phenomena in daily life. But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are
not as real; they form a world ofpotentialities or possibilities rather than one of things
or facts." (Davies and Gribbin 27, original emphasis)
Davies and Gribbin are not frightened ofchaos or indeterminacy. They are excited about the
potential for chaos to "liberate matter" and enthusiastically describethe implications of
quantummechanics and the conditions of realityon the smallest level possible, the Planck
level of reality (I will rely heavily uponDavies and Gribbin in explaining these concepts in
Chapter 3). Perhaps Wilson's unwillingness to deal with or understand these concepts comes
down to the matter of disciplinary boundaries: Davies and Gribbin are physicists, Wilson is a
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biologist. Yet it seems a crippling blow to Wilson's dream of"consilience" among the
sciences that he is unwilling or incapable of accepting, or even acknowledging, the
paradigms and concepts of his declared "foundational" science of physics.
I would now like to comment briefly onWilson's metaphor and hyperbole and the
implications ofhis use of these devices in a text representing a philosophy ofscience to the
general public. While Sax Russell does not explicitly use metaphors as such as Wilson's, his
praxis of objectification ofthe phenomenon under observation, and his conceptualization of
science as a rigid, deterministic and controlled (authoritarian) space, reveal the influence of
the sort ofmetaphoric conceptualization ofscience displayed by Wilson's text. For despite
Wilson's assertion that ''[h]umanbeings are innately disposed to avoidviolent physical
contact" (Wilson 105)(nevermindwars, physical abuse, or even the primate dominance
hierarchies he has claimed are a major factor in determining humanbehavior), his metaphors
concerning science are at best violent, and at worst racist andcolonialist. I will give two
examples.
First, in discussingFrancisBacon's contribution to the creation of modem science,
Wilson approves of, and enjoys,Bacon's description of himself as '^buccinator novi
lemporis, the trumpeter of new times who summoned men 'to makepeacebetween
themselves, and turningwith united forces against theNature of things, to storm and occupy
her castles and strongholds, and extendthe bounds of human empire'" (Wilson 23-24) (for a
critique ofBacon'smetaphors seeLloyd). The perpetuation, through quotation ofBacon, of
this sort of scientific rhetoric underlines the enmitybetweenscientists (or humans in general)
and the universe or reality they experience. The horrible unknown is out there and we must
conquer and destroy it in the name of order.
Second, Wilson compares scientists
with explorers of the sixteenth century, who, having discovered a new coastline,
workedrivers up to the fall line, drewcrudemaps, and commuted home to beg for
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more expeditionarv funds. And governmental and private patrons of[scientists], like
roval geographic commissions ofpast centuries, are generous. They know that history
can bemade bv a single sighting of coastland. where inland lies virgin land and the
future lineaments of empire.
Call the impulse Western ifyou wish, call it androcentric, and by all means dismiss
it as colonialist if you feel you must. I think it instead basic to human nature. (Wilson
100)
Despite Wilson's flip dismissal ofthe critiques he knows will be leveled against him, his
metaphors contain chilling implications. Their unabashed greed for power (and "funding ),
their sexualization of the territory being'"explored," and their refusal to mention what goes
along with the charting of"lineaments ofempire," i.e., genocide, reveal what Wilson and
scientists like him thinkabout the objects (andpeople-as-objects) which they study. Science
asWilson desires it to bepracticed will have the tendency to destroy whatever it objectifies
in the name of power, money anda repressive "empire" of objective truth. These problems
with scientific praxis trouble Sax Russell through much ofRobinson's Mars trilogy, until he
is forced intoan understanding of quantum phenomena and their implications. When, in
quantum mechanics, the experimenter's subjectivity is involved and intertwined with the
phenomena being observed, theWilsonian sortof scientific attitude could be interpreted asa
self-destructive act, especially if human consciousness is a quantum phenomenon (the
majority ofZoharandMarshall's book grapples with just this issue of human
interconnectedness through quantum nonlocality and acausality).
Forthe remainder of this paper I will examine howthe philosophy and epistemology
espoused and articulated byWilson are taken up and examined intheMars trilogy of science
fiction writerKim Stanley Robinson. Science fiction as a genre, among its otherdiscursive
purposes, is a locus for speculation concerning scientific discourses circulating in public
spaces. Robinson's work grapples with the implications of the application ofa theory of
science similar toWilson's in the experiential reality of the characters within the text.
Robinson's scientist character, SaxRussell, wrestles with Wilson's ideas and their tailure to
adequately account for, and guide, several ofSax's experiences. Foremost among these
experiences is his search for an "anamnestic" (literally "loss offorgetting' drug; Robinson,
Blue Mars 587) that will renew portions ofhuman memory subject toquantum collapse and
chaotic (entropic) decay. Sax's search, like Wilson's, is a search for order in the universe, a
search which he is reluctant to give up.
Thecharacter Maya Toitovna, in contrast, has many problems with hermemory (like Sax)
but through an arduous internal process ofexploring how hermemories affect her interaction
with external physical reality, she accepts the chaotic and indeterminate nature of her
everyday existence, andher past, and comes to a rich and satisfying appreciation for the
reality sheexperiences. Sax (and, judging from his text, Wilson as well) would have a very
difficult time accepting sucha richand rewarding set of experiences while chaos and
indeterminacy played suchan integral role in those experiences. Order, constructed by
science, is just too comfortable.
Beforemoving on to my analysis of Robinson's text I would like to give a brief synopsis
of the Mars trilogy. Because of the depth and complex layering (as well as the sheer length)
of Robinson's trilogy, this synopsis will necessarily focus onlyon the verygeneral outlineof
events while omitting descriptions ofmost of the specific subplots. The only exceptions to
this wll be subplots which bear directly on my analysis.
As the title might indicate, Kim Stanley Robinson's Mats, trilogy centers upon the
establishment of a human colony on the planet Mars, and that colony's efforts to change
("terraform") the environment ofMars to make it more amenable to supporting life from
Earth. The narrative focus is concerned with the experiences of the first scientists and
engineers sent to Mars in order to set up the basic infrastructure of the colonial endeavor, as
well as to explore the planet. This group of scientists is known as the First Hundred (because
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they number one hundred people) and. because oftheir fame and expertise, the text places
them as a sort of technocratic elite class within Martian colonial society.
Themain narrative tension within the trilogy is the conflict between theMartian colonists
and Terran transnational (and later metanational) corporate interests who are concerned only
with exploiting Mars's resources and labor (colonists) for their own profit. The climax ot
each volume of the trilogy comes with the resolution of separate conflicts (mostly violent
uprisings) between the colonists and the corporate interests of Earth. In the first volume,
Red Mars, tensions are heightened between Earth andMars after the assassination of John
Boone, the first person to land onMars and one of theFirst Hundred. Another of the First
Hundred, Frank Chalmers, John's friend and rival for the affections ofMayaToitovna,
orchestrated John's assassination out ofjealousy, and with the aim of solidifying his own
power to construct treaties betweenMarsand Earth. However, after these treaties are
enacted it becomes clear that the corporate interests have no intention of abidingby them,
and war breaks out on Mars (coincidental with a world war on Earth fought between
countriesbeholden to corporate interests against rival corporations' countries). Because of
the corporate control of communications and the onlymeansof access to the surfaceof
Mars, the ''space elevator" (a devicewhichconnects an asteroid spacestation to the surface
of the planet), the corporations easily quashthe "Rebellion" and the surviving FirstHundred,
who were leaders of the conflict, are forced to go into hiding.
A major scientific discovery is also made in the first volume of the trilogy. Members of
the First Hundred develop a "gerontological treatment," a drug which, when administered to
an individual, repairsdamage and replication errors to that person's DNA, thus lengthening
the span of the individual's life. This "gerontological treatment" not only serves as a source
of scientific speculation within the novel, but also acts as a plot device which lengthens the
lifespans of the protagonists and allows the narrative focus of the trilogyto remainon the
First Hundred over 200 years of narrative plotline.
Another conflict which arises in the first volume is the conflict between those scientists
and colonists who favor terraforming Mars (the "Greens") and those who desire the surface
ofthe planet to remain in its pristine form (the "Reds"). Chief representatives ofthese
groups are, respectively, Sax Russell and Ann Claybome. Sax, aWilsonian-type
"scientist-hero," begins to experiment with various terraforming techniques immediately
upon his arrival on Mars, in violation ofthe UN treaty on the subject. Ann Claybome
remains violently opposed to any alteration ofthe planetary environment throughout the
trilogy. Their differences on this issue create an antagonistic relationship between Ann and
Sax.
In the second volume. Green Mars, thecorporate powers are firmly in control of affairs
on the planet and are engaged in radical terraforming ofMars's surface, using techniques
which make even theGreens uneasy. Sax, who has been bored since being forced to go into
hiding to escape the corporations, assumes a dual identity, Stephen Lindholm, and re-enters
theMartian scientific community in orderto continue hiswork on terraforming and the
creation of a transplanted Earthly biome onto Mars. He is discovered by Phyllis, a member
of the First Hundred in collusionwith the corporations, and is tortured and nearly killed, an
experience which profoundly affects his thoughts about what thehuman race is doing to
Mars.
Green Mars ends with a second "Rebellion" against the corporations, this one much more
successful, resulting in a Free Mars which, in thenext volume of thetrilogy, Blue Mars, will
become the dominant poweriri the SolarSystem. That thirdvolume is mostly concerned
with the progression of the transplanted biome and the terraforming project, along with
speculations about a Utopian economic andsocial order which hassprung up in thecontext
ofMartian social practices. For purposes of thispaper, the important events of this volume
center around thedegeneration of thememory ofmost people who have undergone repeated
gerontological treatments, a phenomenon often accompanied bythe"swift decline," a
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sudden failure ofthe body followed by death. Maya Toitovna, one ofthe First Hundred, is
the main protagonist who displays the range ofthe memory problems, and the text is very
interested in what these problems do to her subjectivity. Sax Russell, in an effort to make
progress in the matter ofthe "swift decline" focuses his research on developing adrug to
alleviate the memory problems. This research brings him face to face with quantum
indeterminacy andchaos, as I will describe in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: "SLEEP. ivtEMORY:" LEARNING TO LIVE WITH INDETERMINACY
L "Quantum Weirdness''
When Kim Stanley Robinson's scientist "hero" Sax Russell begins having insomnia from
the strain ofmaintaining his double identity as Stephen Lindholm, his thoughts turn to the
frustratins non-scientific fields of the humanities. Sax realizes he must understand the
history ofthe preceding decades in order to comprehend the present situation on Mars and
what the future may hold. He runs into a very basic problem.
The scientific method could not be applied to humanbeings in anyway
that yielded useful information.. . . [HJuman reality could only be explained
in terms of values. And values were very resistant to scientific analysis. .. .
Values drove history, which was whole, nonrepeatable, and contingent. It might
be characterized as Lamarckian, or as a chaotic system, but even those were
guesses (Robinson, Green Mars 189; original emphasis; cited hereafter as
GM)
Sax finally concludes that "[p]eople [are] not rational systems" (Robinson, GM 193).
Earlier in the novel. Saxhad phrased hisdifficulties with the humanities in a slightly
different way. He believes that the humanities, unlike thesciences, construct theirsystems
as analogies rather than homologies. The humanities "added up to a huge compendium of
meaningless analogies which didnot help toexplain things, but only distorted perception of
them" (Robinson, GM159). What Saxthinks he hasdiscovered is the power of
non-scientific disciplinary master-narratives to "distort theperception" of the person engaged
with those narratives. He conveniently overlooks his own engagement with the
master-narrative of Enlightermient epistemology and its tale of perpetual progress and
eventual unification, through scientific method, of all humanknowledges. Edward O.
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Wilson (one of the creators of sociobiolog>', which Sax Russell sees as a "promising" field;
Robinson, GM 189) calls this vision of unity "consilience." "[C]onsilience [is] literally a
'jumping together' ofknowledge by the linking offacts and fact-based theon- to create a
common groundwork ofexplanation" (Wilson 8). The metaphor of"jumping together
influences Sax throughout the entire trilogy, finally giving him the means tobe reconciled
with his colleague/nemesis Ann Claybome. They 'jump" their differing viewpoints together,
each speaking for the other, and thus avert the impending third crisis with the Terran
metanational corporations.
Buteven more significantly, Wilson's vision of "consilience" informs Sax's attempts to
make progress in solving the problem of the failed gerontological treatments which have
successfully extended the lifespans of those people able to afford them. The key to his
(possible) success ishis ability tobridge disciplinary boundaries in order to provide a
common "groundwork" for all areas of knowledge. However, where Wilson, in thebest
tradition of Enlightenment optimism, is hostile to chaos ("[OJrder, not chaos, lies beyond the
horizon;" Wilson 13), Sax finds the situation to be a bit more complex.
Saxhas already decided that the humanities "distort the perception" and that their subjects
might be described as "chaotic systems." Themain difference between nonchaotic and
chaotic systems is that the former are quite predictable, while the latter are unpredictable.
Nonchaotic systems accumulate errors in a slow, linear progression in time which is easily
predicted and corrected. Chaotic systems, in contrast, accumulate errors exponentially in
time and are thereforehighly unpredictable (for an illuminating description of the difference
between nonchaotic and chaotic systems, see Davies and Gribbin 33-38).
Sax wishes to find a pattern in hurrianhistory that will allow him to predict, however
roughly, the future of humans on Mars.
The little reading he did in historiography was not encouraging; it was either a sad
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imitation of the scientific method, or art pure and simple Sociobiolog}' and
bioethics were more promising, but they tended to explain things best when working
on evolutionary time scales, and he wanted something for the past hundred years, and
the next hundred. Or even the past fifty andthe next five (Robinson, GM 189)
Sax finds history to be chaotic, unpredictable, and useless to him because ofa lack of
scientifically grounded discourse in the field. Much later in the fictional chronology of the
trilogv', this particular problem is solved for Sax by the Martian historian Charlotte Dorsa
Brevia, who lives and works in the matriarchal Dorsa Brevia culture.
The theory of history Dorsa Brevia articulates is a sort of indeterminate telos of
socioeconomic periods of history.
[Charlotte DorsaBrevia] described what she calleda "residual/emergent complex of
overlapping paradigms," in which each great socioeconomic erawas comprised of
roughly equal parts of the systems immediately adjacent to it in past and future. The
periods immediately beforeand afterwere not the only ones involved, however: they
formed the bulk of a system, and composed its most contradictory components, but
additional important features came from particularly persistent aspects of more archaic
systems, and also faint hesitant intuitions of developments that would not flower until
much later. (Robinson, Blue Mars 429-430; hereafter cited as BM)
Dorsa Brevia asserts that this telos is working progressively from the "dominance hierarchies
of our primate ancestors on the savanna, towardthe ... undetermined, free emergence of a
pure harmony and equality which would then characterize the very truest democracy"
(Robinson, BM 430). She justifies this speculative statement by examining past periods of
history and noting that, in general, the move of history has always been a swing between two
poles, those ofdominance hierarchies on the one hand, and democracy on the other. Thus, in
one stroke, she ties history into a large paradigm/pattern, firmly rooted in sociobiology's
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assessment ofprimate power structures, and from which, despite the;repeated stress on its
"undetermined" nature, it is possible to make tentative predictions.
When Sax finally gets around to reading Dorsa Brevia's work he is "in anexcited state at
finding a general paradigm that might clarify history for him at lasf (Robinson, BM 431).
Although the reasons for his excitement are not stated explicitly in the text at this point, the
subtext is easy to recognize: history is not, after all, a "chaotic system" rife with
unpredictability, but instead apatterned system with its own rules. In spite ofthe basic
indeterminacy ofher theory, Dorsa Brevia even attempts a tentative prediction about the next
phase ofhuman history (after the '"democratic" phase which she believes tohave emerged on
Mars from the previous capitalist system), which she calls "Harmony, orGeneral Goodwill"
(Robinson, BM 430). Robinson's textdescribes themethodology Dorsa Brevia uses in
making this prediction asbeing rooted ina combination ofobservations ofwhich entities had
been accorded status as "equals" in previous socioeconomic eras, and observations of her
contemporary socioeconomic system which is based in "cooperative economics" (asopposed
to hierarchical capitalism) and in which "the circle of equal citizens hadbloomed wider.. .
until now not onlywere all humans (in theory, anyway) equal, but consideration was being
given to other animals, and even to plants, ecosystems, and the elements" (Robinson, BM
430, 431).
Sax approves ofDorsa Brevia's theory (with one significant reservation) because it is in
the first stages of becoming a "true" science. EdwardO. Wilson describes the scientific
process as being primarily concerned with reductionism, "[t]he cutting edge of science...,
the breaking apart of nature into its natural constituents" (Wilson 54). (In line with Wilson's
enthusiasm for the Baconian and Enlightenment emphasis on the basic violent nature of the
scientific project, he again reproduces this in his metaphors. Thus the "cutting edge" of
science, reductionism, is described as a "scalpel or catheter" which will "[break] apart...
nature"" [Wilson 54]). While reductionism, in Wilson's scheme of science, is the most
important tool, he also stresses "synthesis and integration."" Not only must science break
things apart, it must also be able to put them back together again. Scientific progress hmges
on -•meditat[ing] on the networks of cause and effect across adjacent levels of
oraanization-from subatomic particles to atoms, say, or organisms to species--and
[scientists] must think on the hidden design and forces of the networks of causation" (Wilson
54, 55). As Iwill describe, this particular concept seems difficult for Sax to realize in his
lived experience.
Dorsa Brevia's work is reductionist, ultimately tracing human historical processes back to
the sociobiolpgical concept ofprimate dominance hierarchies, one of several basic genetic
principles governing human behavior which Wilson terms epigenetic rules (see Wilson
164 and passim). From, this basic unit Dorsa Brevia synthesizes and recombines upwards to
greater and greater levels of historical process and organization, ultimately developing a
theori/ ofcausality across those levels oforganization. Ideally, ofcourse, the aim ofany
science is predictability. Dorsa Brevia is able to make some guesses, but ultimately her
scheme is still '•undetermined," or indeterminate. Indeterminacy is not as problematic for
predictability as chaos is; it is possible to make statistical guesses about probable outcom.es.
Only statistical probabilities are possible, however, not hard predictions.
While Sax seems to appreciate Dorsa Brevia's work as scientific progress in the field of
history, even being "excited" about it, he cannot accept it as avalid scientific theory. In the
passage where Sax reads her work, Dorsa Brevia's predictions ofHarmony are charactenzed
as "faint" "glimmerings" and "avague hypothesis" (Robinson, BM 431). Sax finally decides
DorsaBrevia's prediction of future "Harmony" is too idealistic.
[H]e wondered if the putative age ofuniversal harmony and goodwill would ever
actually com.e about; it seemed to him. possible or even likely that there was som.e sort
of asvTnptotic curve [a line that constantly approaches, but never reaches, an end point]
in the human story-the ballast of the body, perhaps-which would keep civilization
struggling there in the age of democracy, struggling always upward, also away from
relapse, and never getting much further along .... (Robinson, BM 431)
So while Dbrsa Brevia's paradigm is reductionist, synthetic, useful and enlightening. Sax
ultimately rejects the conclusions she draws from her paradigm as being "vague" and
idealistic (perhaps idealism is yet another product of the humanities' tendency to "distort"
the "perceptions''). History is still too indeterminate and Dorsa Brevia's predictions not
probable enough for Sax to accept them unhesitatingly as science.
Yet Sax's foray into the humanities is significantly placed in the chronology of the
trilog)'. It is described in the introductory section ofPart 11 ("Viriditas") of Blue Mars. This
section takes place after Sax has had time to contemplate the attempts of the Da Vinci group
of scientific researchers to discover a unified quantum/superstring theory ofgravity, and
before his own work begins on a quantum theory ofmemory storage in the human brain.
Quantum phenomena, much like Dorsa Brevia's metahistorical telos, are indeterminate and,
uniike the historian's paradigm, often seem to lack commonsense causalities. Sax goes on to
bring consilience between neurology and quantum physics in his quest for a solution to the
problematic gerontological treatments. By doing so he is demonstrating Wilson's scientific
method in exemplary fashion, positingthe basicmemory units in the brain as quantum units
and theorizing a web of causal effects from the quantum level of organization up to the
complex level of neural cells. But bybasinghis theory in quantum discourse he is grounding
his work in a field that is unpredictable (or indeterminate), lacks firm causation and is very
close to the "chaos" whichmakesWilson so uncomfortable. It maybe argued that the
paradoxical effects of thequantum realm have negligible impact on the level of living
organisms, yet Sax's whole argument, and thebasisfor his later experience, rests on the
assumpTion that quantum effects do impact living organisms. Iwould like to look a bit
closer at the sections of Blue Mars where Sax's thoughts on quantum phenomena are
described so that 1can examine how his theory progresses from "vague hypothesis" to
acceptable scientific paradigm, how those "quantum" thoughts impinge on his lived
experience, and what these sections of text do to the novel as a whole. But first, 1need to lay
out some basic concepts about quantum phenomena. Forthis discussion, I have relied
heavilvon the discussion of quantum mechanics (or "quantumweirdness" as Davies and
Gribbin term it in a chapter title) in The Matter Mvth. a text by two physicists, Paul Davies
and John Gribbin, intended for a general audience interested in science. I chose this text for
its comprehensiveness and clarity comparedwith other such texts I have read. While 1am.
providing this information in order to make my discussion ofRobinson's te.xt more
comprehensible for a non-scientific audience, I am not overly concernedwith establishing
the "truth" or "validity" of this discourse. As Tstated in chapter 2, it is these scientific ideas
and how they affect and circulate within culture, not necessarily the mathematical or
methodological grounds of the research, that I am interested in examining.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of quantum phenomena in terms ofmy
discussion of Robinson's Mars trilogy is the implication of the observer in the quantum
events being observed. This effect was first noticed in experiments into the wave/particle
duality of subatomic components during the middle decades of the twentieth century. The
experiments were inspired by a phenomenon first observed by Thomas Young in the early
nineteenth century. Young shone a light source (essentially a stream or wave of photons)
through two separate but adjacent slits in an opaque screen, and observed the resulting
pattern of light on a second screen behind the first. The light from the two slits formed a
pattern of light and dark strips known as an "interference fringe," and the formation of this
pattern can be attributed to the "wave" nature of the light source used. In the nventieth
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centurv' the same experiment was carried out using electrons, instead of photons, as the
source while a television screen sensitive to the impact of electrons served as the second
screen. The electrons in such an experiment also form an interference fringe, attesting to
their"wave" nature, a rather surprising result at the time, since it was thought thatelectrons
manifested themselves solely as discrete particles.
A further experiment was carried out inwhich a single electron at a time was fired
through the slit system of the first screen and the emerging pattern was observed as it built up
over time. One of the basic rules of quantum mechanics, the discipline concerned with
describing and explaining quantum phenomena, is Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which
describes the basic indeterminate nature of subatomic phenomena. One of the forms this
principle takes concerningquantum particles is that an observercan measureeither the
positionof the particle, or its momentum, but neverboth at once. It follows that a given
particle (or wave) does not exist as a discreteentitywhile it is in motion (and conversely
does not move while it exists as a discrete entity). Instead, it is more accurate to conceive of
it as existing as a statistical probability while it is in motion. Because of this property, it is
impossible to be certain through which slit any given electron will pass when fired singly in
an experiment like the one described above. An electron only gained a determinate existence
when its impact was measured on the second screen. The "commonsense" expectation might
be that when fired singly through the slit system the patterns the electrons would make on the
second screen would be entirely random. Instead, the single electrons formed the
interference fringe associated with the previous "wave" experiments.
The moment chosen to determine where a particle is turns out to be critical to the
experiment. In a thought experiment, quantum physicist Niels Bohr, who helped create the
field of quantum mechanics in the 1920s, predicted that if the experimenter chose to
determine throughwhich slit the electrons were passing (for example, by placinga counterat
35
each slit; because the counters measure position they would act as "observers"), the added
uncertaint\' introduced into the system by the counters themselves would smear out the
interference fringe, leaving two randomly formed smudges of impacts on the second screen.
The veiy act of determining theposition of the particles as they passed through the slits was
the deciding factor in what sort of patternwouldappear on the screen. This was later
confirmed in physical laboratory experiments.
In the 1960s John Wheeler proposeda further thought experiment, later confirmed in
laboratory experiments, in which the experimenter waits until after the particle has passed
through the first screen before decidingto discoverwhich slit it passed through. 'The
decision of the experimenter aboutwhetheror not to lookback at (he time theparticles
arrive at the screen determines whether or not the light was behaving in the manner of
particles or waves at an earliermoment, at the timewhen it passed through the slit system in
the tirst screen" (Davies and Gribbin 213; original emphasis). So even after the fact it is the
experimenter's decision about what to look for that determines the behavior and constitution
of what is being observed on a subatomic level. There do not appear to be spatial or
temporal limits to this effect. Davies and Gribbin write that "the quantum nature of reality
involves nonlocal effects that could in principle reach right across the Universe and stretch
back eons in time" (Davies and Gribbin 214). At the quantum level, the universe is a
holistic, if indeterminate and uncertain, system.
The scientific ideal of "objectivity" becomes meaningless on a quantum level. Moreover
when these quantirai principles are extended beyond the subatomic, "objectivity," and to a
certain degree "predictability," become problematic even at the macroscopic levels of living
organisms, planets, stars, and the universe itself When the decision is made to determine
where a particle is, what the observer is doing is removing the "particle" from, its nature as a
statistical probability (uncertainty as to where it m.ight be), and demanding to know the
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actual results for that individual particle: that is, not where the particle is likely to be. but
where it is. This process is known as "collapsing the wave function" of the particle. The
problem is that macroscopic objects havewave lengths and, therefore, wave functions as
well. Davies and Gribbin seem to be contradictory concerning this point. At one place in
their text they write:
Inprinciple, even macroscopic objects such as people and planets have their individual
quantum waves. . . . The reason we never notice those waves ... [is because] the
length of the waves diminishes in proportion to the momentum. So the greater the
mass of the object involved, the shorter the waves. . . . When it comes to people and
planets, the waves are so ridiculously short that for all practical purposes they can be
ignored.
They continue, "There are, however, deep issues of principle connected with the fact that
matter waves exist even for macroscopic bodies" (Davies and Gribbin 207; my emphasis).
Yet later in the same chapter, after discussing how an observer is implicated in the
experiment and the role that observer plays in collapsing the wave functions of particles.
Davies and Gribbin state:
If nobody looks then the wave never collapses. So the behavior of a particle such as an
electron appears to vary according to whether it is being watched or not. This .. . may
not seem of any great concern... —who ... really cares what an electron is doing
when we are not looking at it? But the issue goes beyond electrons. If macroscopic
objects also have associated waves, then in principle the independent reality of
everything seems to go into the quantum melting pot. (Davies and Gribbin 217;
original emphasis)
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This apparent contradiction or ambivalence within Davies's and Gribbin's text about the
"real" effects of the waves of macroscopic objects reflects disagreements within the
scientific community about those effects.
The problemof macroscopicwaves and their possible effect upon the "objective" reality
ofmacroscopic objects is illustrated by physicist Erwin Schrodinger's thought experiment
popularly known as ''Schrodinger's Cat." A cat is placed in a box along with a bottle of
cyanide and a hammer for breaking the bottle. The hammer is attached to a Geiger counter
near a source of radiation. If an alpha particle is emitted from the radioactive source it will
be detected by the Geiger counter which will trigger the hammer, release the cyanide and
thereby kill the cat.'
The difficulty is with the alpha particle and its ability to tunnel free of its host atom. This
tunneling is a quantum phenomenon in which the particle's wave function is bouncing
around inside the atomic nucleus, kept there by a force called the "strong" force. One of the
characteristics of waves in general is their ability to occasionally pass through (or ''jump" or
"tunnel through") very thin barriers (Davies and Gribbin use the exam.ple of a light being
able to pass through a very thin reflecting surface). The strong force keeps most of the alpha
waves inside the nucleus, but there will always be some leakage, which results in an alpha
wave appearing outside the nucleus. As a wave, of course, it is a set of statistical
probabilities and not a discrete particle, still indeterminate. It is only when an observer
attempts to locate the particle that the wave flmction collapses from indeterminacy about its
'Analpha particle is basically anatomic nucleus consisting oftwo protons and two neutrons,
chosen for this experimentbecauseof its abilityto escape from its host atom, a veryrare
occurrence for anysingle atombut, because of the large numbers of suchatoms, frequent
enough to be noticed by researchers..
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activities and location into determinacy. So while the cat and the radioactive atom are both
locked away inside the box, unobserved by the researcher, it is impossible to determine
whether an alpha particle has escaped from the atom or not and therefore whether the cat is
dead or not. The quantum wave associated with the cat becomes interdependent with the
wave of the alpha particle creating an unresolved indeterminate set of probabilities leaving a
quantum cat in the box, both living and dead at the same time. The cat is regarded as being
both living and dead at once because quantum phenomena are not only affected by what
actually ends up happening to them, but also by everything that might happen. Thus the
"quantum" cat contains both possibilities (live and dead) until the box is opened and a
researcher collapses the combined wave functions of both cat and alpha particle to determine
the corporeal state of the cat.
"Schrddinger's cat" illustrates the complex interrelatedness of the subjectivity of the
researcher with the objects or phenomena observed, even with macroscopic objects such as
cats. This interrelatedness can even extend to humans. For example, the indeterminate state
of the cat can become more complex by increasing the area containing the wave function.
The question arises: if a lone scientist in a lab looks in the box and knows the state of the cat,
does that determinacy apply to a scientistworking in the lab next door? It would seem that
the wave function has collapsed for one scientist and not for the other until the first scientist
communicates the news to the other. The chain can then be increased from labs to lab
building to city to world at largeto universe. There aremajor disagreements am.ong
quantum physicists about how to resolve these problems, as Davies and Gribbin relate.
Some physicists believe quantum mechanics will fail for systems as large and complex
as cats. Another opinion is that quantum physics can tell us nothing about individual
alphaparticles or cats, but only about the statistics of collections of identical systems,
so that we cansaythat ifwewere to perform thesame experiment with a thousand
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cats in identical boxes then a certain fraction of the cats (as determined by the
quantum rules) will be found alive and the rest dead. But that simply dodges the
question ofwhat happens to any individual cat. (Davies and Gribbin 219)
Whatever conclusions the scientific community may arrive at to these problems, it seems
undeniable that according to quantum discourse the universe does not exist inquite the wa\
Newton formulated in his classical mechanistic conception of physics, well-ordered and
solidly objective no matter what. Instead, Davies and Gribbin conclude, "[Quantum
phenomena endow] the world with anextremely subjective element, for [they oblige] us to
suppose that, in the absence of observation, theexternal world does not exist in a
well-defined sense. It is as though through our observations we actually create, rather than
explore, the external world" (Davies and Gribbin 226).
This subjective and indeterminate nature of reality is what scientists likeSaxRussell are
forced to cometo grips with. Robinson's text explores the effects of Sax's initial resistance
to, and repression of, chaos and indeterminacy in his "scientific" conception of reality, and
shows how he is finally required to accept and even appreciate those very qualities as they
affect his life and refine his scientific understanding of the universe.
2. The Indeterminate Moment
Because of the effects ofquantum phenomena at the subatomic level. Sax Russell is
forced to accept a certain amount of unpredictability in particular macroscopic phenomena
he needs to deal wnth. As I indicated eariier Sax was unable to accept this with a "chaotic
system" such as a human being and, consequently, with discourses concerning human affairs
like politics, history or psychology, even when he discovers that, in the case of history, the
phenomena concerned are not "chaotic" but indeterminate. He chooses to begin
investigating indeterminacy in a much "safer" discipline, physics, and specifically the areas
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of quantum gravitv' and superstring theory*. Sax's ruminations on quantum gravity' begin at a
significant point in the narrative of Blue Mars, He is out wandering a Martian tundra that is
literally covered by new genetically altered plant life introduced over several decades by the
Martian colonists. Sax is awestruck by how life has so quickly appeared on what was
formerly a lifeless planet. He begins thinking about it in terms of entropy. ''Why was there
increasing order in any part of the cosmos, when one might expect nothing but entropy
everywhere?" (Robinson, BM 371). Spencer, along with Sax one of the First Hundred
scientists to settle Mars, offers Sax a theory. "[r]n an expanding universe . . . order was not
merely order, but the difference between the actual entropy exhibited and the maximum
entropy possible" (Robinson, BM, 371). Sax finds this an intriguing idea, but while looking
at sunlight falling on flowers he thinks of the plants as "[i]deograms oforder. They did not
look like a mere difference in entropic levels" (Robinson, BM 371).
What is significant about these speculations as a starting point for Sax's thoughts on
quantum phenomena is the concept of entropy. Davies and Gribbin define entropy as "a
precise quantification of the degree of disorder in a physical system" (Davies and Gribbin
125). Entropy can never decrease in a closed system, which ultimately is what the universe
is, albeit a quite large system. Entropy, or chaos, is what Wilsonwishes to deny and fight
against using a science based on strict, mechanistic principles. Sax, likewise, shares
Wilson's anxiety about chaos, choosing to see flowers as "ideograms of order" rather than as
entropy. While Saxmay be falling back on a sort of "commonsense" interpretation of floral
reality, he does so at the expense of ignoring what his valued scientific discourses tell him
about the nature of reality and its fundamentally (and foundationally) chaotic and
indeterminate make-up. He (alongwithWilson) is still refusing to accommodate the
presenceof chaotic systems in his conceptual (allegedly scientific) fi-amework.
41
Part of what is causing Sax problems at this point in the trilog>' is an inability* to conceive
of different levels of reality other than the macroscopic level at which lived experience
occurs, as perceived by the human brain. Sax fleetingly notes this while gazing at the chaotic
(i.e., nonlinear because ultimately entropic) systems of the tundra flowers.
Such a fme texture to a flower petal; drenched in light, it was almost as if it were
visible molecule by molecule: there a white molecule, there lavender, there clematis
blue. These pointillist dots were not molecules, of course, which were well below-
visible resolution. And even if molecules had been visible, the ultimate building
blocks of the petal [subatomic particles] were so much smaller than that that they were
hard to imagine-finer than one's conceptual resolution, one might say. (Robinson,
BM371)
This passage is directly preceded by Sax's rejection of the flowers as entropic constructs and
immediately followed by a ten page discussion of work the Da Vinci group has been doing
on a quantum/superstring theory of gravity. This baffling of*'one's" (Sax's?) conceptual
resolution is a sign for the difficulties Sax's mode of science causes him. The confusion is
rooted in a lived experience at the macroscopic level (looking at flowers) and launches the
"one" who experiences it into an abstract chain of thought at a conceptual level far below
lived experience (superstrings and quantum mechanics). Sax's science cannot bridge the gap
between lived experience and subatomic phenomena. While Sax, the observer, is observing
the flowers and intimately experiencing them as objects in a "real" world, he has to distance
himself from the object of his thoughts when that object becomes subatomic (signaled by the
appearanceof "one" as a term for the self, an attemptat distanceand objectivity). This
distancing is paradoxical since the proper scientific attitudewhile "observing"macroscopic
objects is one of remove and distance, a separation of the observer from the observed,
whereas with quantum phenomena theobserver intimately interacts with thephenomena
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observed. In line with this move to distance his subjectivity from the object he is observing
is Sax's move towards aestheticization of the observed, a move which effectively imposes a
framing device by placing the object (in this case flowers) within an artistic discourse that
objectifies the observed phenomenon and asserts the dominance and control of the observer
over that phenomenon. This sort of aesthetic move is common to Sax when he is faced with
phenomena he feels he cannot control or place within his rigidly ordered scientific
framework. It is a move which has some disturbing implications, especially when, as is
increasingly the case in the latter half of the last novel in Robinson's trilogy, the "objects*'
aestheticized are women. However, this move also represents his genuine attempt to find a
way to reconcile his own "quantum" lived experience with his scientific paradigm, a move
which comes to fruition in his final dealings with Ann Claybome.
Sax's confusion at the place in Robinson's novel where he aestheticizes and admires the
tundra flowers is mirrored in the text by a blurring and confusion of chronological time in the
plot. The chronological relation between the individual, Sax Russell, gazing at flowers on
the Martian tundra, and the "one" objective Sax Russell who sits in on the afternoon
discussions of gravitation at Da Vinci is unclear (and indeterminate). In the long paragraph
that takes Sax in his thoughts from flowers to quantum gravity (Robinson, BM 371-372) the
terms describing time are all imprecise: "recently the theory group at Da Vinci," "Sax had
recently started trying to understand what they were doing," and "in the rainy season he had
[foregone seaclifF for seminar rooms]." It appearsas if the quantum gravity sessions
occurredbefore Sax's tundra flowergazing experience, but the reference to a rainy season
makes them also seem like ongoing events before, during, and after. The text never returns
to a solitary Saxon the tundra; instead, when he is nextdescribed as looking at flowers it is
in the presence of the female physicist/mathematician Bao Shuyo, near the end of the ten
page discussion of quantum gravity. At Sax's moment ofconfusion the text's time becomes
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"smeared/" much like Davies and Gribbin's description of occurrences on the smallest scale
of realitv-. the Planck scale (10"^-' cm; see Davies and Gribbin 163-164), the scale on which
quantum gravity appears to operate, and at the same lime the causation of Sax's train of
thought becomes uncertain. Do his reflections on flowers turn his thoughts to his
experiences with quantum gravity, or vice versa? Or does his flowergazing experience with
Bao, seemingly in the "future" of his solitary experience, act as a causative agent for what
precedes it? The blurring of the bounds of Sax's experience, the smearing of time in the text,
and the indeterminate causality of events at this point in the novel make it tempting to see
Sax as having a peculiarly "quantum" experience.
The blurring of the abstract with his lived experience, and the realization of that blurring,
cause Sax an epistemological dissonance which continues through his experiment with the
'"anamnestic" (from "anamnesis," literally "loss of forgetting;" Robinson, BM 587) memory
restoration drug he helps to create. The moments of dissonance are always brought on by
Sax's realization of the shortcomings of his conceptual resolution, and they are almost
always connected with his relationships with women. The first of these women to appear
after his realization of his confusion is the youngMartian physicist Bao, who is "one of the
pantheon" of great physicists and mathematicians, the "driving force" of the quantum gravity
sessions and "the only female mathematical genius [Sax] had ever even heard of (Robinson,
BM374).
Fromthe moment she enters the text it is clear that Sax is in awe not onlyof the subjects
under discussion, but of the genius, looks and mannerisms ofBao herself She is "small for
one of the young natives [ofMars], though still halfa meter taller thanSax.. . . [S]he even
sometimes stuttered, which Saxfound extremely endearing" (Robinson, BM374). He is
overwhelmed most ofall by her brilliance, her genius at mathematics. When Bao leaves Da
Vinci a few pages af^er she comes into the text. Sax reflects that even he "himself, who had
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no prejudices whatsoever, hadbeen amazed to see a woman mathematician at work"
(Robinson, BM 380). This sentence is evidently not tongue-in-cheek; Sax truly believes that
his dedication to science lends him an objectivity that puts him above trivia! prejudices, or
everyday life (he refers to unscientific conversational topics as a "waste [of] time . ., trivial
things:"' Robinson, BM375). When Bao leaves, Sax is nobetter at understanding her and her
genius, or how to reconcile work on superstrings with personal life, than he was when at the
height of his quantum confusion.
Again, Sax's confusion is clearly signaled in the text during a discussion of the basics of
superstring theory and the attempts of twenty-second century scientists to unite that theory
with quantum mechanics for the ultimate purpose of unifying gravity to the other forces in
the universe. Superstring theory "describe[s] the smallest particles of spacetime [e.g., quarks
which make up subatomic particles] not as geometrical points but as ultramicroscopic loops.
.. vibrating in ten dimensions" (Robinson, BM 372). Sax can accept this theory on a purely
discursive level; it "account[s] very elegantly and plausibly for the various forces and
particles as perceived at the subatomic level... and their gravitational effects as well,"
although their scale makes them "somewhat exotic mathematical objects" to his mind
(Robinson, BM 372) and ultimately it is the extreme scale of the events described in the
theory that causes him trouble.
It first appears that the problem is purely one ofobjective experimentation and
methodology. This is the beginning of the last full paragraph on page 372 of Blue Mars:
[Referring to advances in superstring theory:] All very well; indeed, exciting. But
the problem, for Sax and many other skeptics, came with the difficulty of confirming
any of the beautiful math by experiment^ a difficulty caused by the very, very, very
small sizes of the loops and spaces being theorized. These were all in the lO-^^
centimeter range, the so-called Planck length,.... (my emphasis)
45
Quite suddenly, in the middle of a sentence in the middle of the paragraph the "problem"
with the theor\' shifts from objectivemethodology to subjective imagination:
, . and this lengthwas so much smaller than subatomic particles that it was hard to
imagine. A typical atomic nucleus was about 10"'^ centimeter in diameter, or one
millionth of a billionth of a centimeter. First Sax had triedvery hard to contemplate
that distance fora while; hopeless, butone had to try, one hadto hold that hopelessly
mconceivable smallness m the mind for a moment. Andthen remember that m string
theory they were talking about a distancetwentymagnitudes smaller still—about
_objects one thousandth of one billionth of one billionth the size of an atomic nucleus! .
. . A [size] which rationality itselfcould scarcely comprehend, (my emphasis)
The beginning of the next paragraph continues thethought about problems of experimental
methodology.
The above paragraph displays the confusion Sax feels about objective and subjective
positions when contemplating such minuscule scales. The confusion is marked not onlv by
the abrupt shift between the two states in the middle ofa single sentence, but also by the
sudden appearance ofan attempt to regain objectivity through the use of "one" asa referent
for the selt ("one had to try," "one had to hold"). Sax, inthis paragraph, seems more or less
unaware of his confusion. He first becomes cognizant of his confusion in his interactions
with the mathematician Bao, the person who is successfully making "several specific
predictions [about theeffect of superstrings] in the larger realms of theatom and thecosmos
. .. some of [which] had since been confirmed" (Robinson, BM 375).
In the person ofBao Sax faces a scientist who has no troubles bridging the gaps that cause
him so many problems: subjective and objective states, scientific and lived experiences,
Planck and macroscopic scales. Nor is she bothered by matters ofindeterminacy or chaos.
While her theory ofgravity relies on quantum indeterminacy, she is able to bridge the
46
conceptual gap between indeterminate acausal effects and determinate causal effects through
her understanding of how superstrings, "vibrating harmonically in ten-dimensional spin
networks" (i.e.. strings working together in a sort of emergent quantum system: Robinson.
BM 372), form the effects and substance of quarks and particles which are otherwise
indeterminate.
Sax first recognizes this quality in Bao during a conversation they have while sailing {the
first ofmany "dates" they have). Sax asks her, "Do you ever worry that work on a realm so
far beyond the reach of experiment will turn out to be a kind of house of cards-knocked over
by some simple discrepancy in the math, or some later different theory that does the job
better, or is more confirmable?" Bao replies, "No. ... Something so beautiful as this has to
be true" (Robinson, BM 376). This answer makes Sax uncomfortable; it replaces the
aspiration in scientific discourses towards objectivity through confirmable experimental
results (which Sax still believes to be desirable) with a subjective aesthetic critenon for
judging scientific validity (an aesthetic criterion which differs from Sax's aesthetic moves, 1
would argue, in that it is entirely predicated upon the fundamental uncertainty ofthe
phenomenon involved, and therefore does not deprive the phenomenon ofagency in the
reality outside of scientific discursive spaces). His discomfort is made more acute by his
awareness of Bao's scientific genius. During a lull in the conversation Sax observes Bao and
begins to understand consciously the sourceof his discomfort. "She closed her eyes--as if
she could see it all written down, on the inside of her eyelids. Everything in the world. Sax
felt a piercing stab of envy, of-loss. Hehadalways wanted that kindof insight, and there it
was right in the boat beside him. Genius was a strange thing to v^atness" {Robinson, BM
377). He begins to comprehendthat her genius and her ability to conceptualize diffenng
scales of reality are linked upwith her ideas of science as a subjective appreciation of
beauty, something his rigid scientific paradigm cannot allow. Hehas "always wanted" what
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Bao has, and yet his feeling of loss seems to imply that once, perhaps in a time he cannot
remember, he did indeed have it. But at this point in his life he cannot find it, though he
attempts it through his objectifying aesthetic appreciation for Bao's (plain) beaut\-. "Light
flaked off the fine black hair gathered at the back of Bao's neck. . .. Networks, trembling at
the touch of the sun--no. He could not see it, with eyes open or closed" (Robinson. BM 377).
He is still incapable of conceptualizing a realm as small (chaotic and indeterminate) as that
in which superstrings vibrate.
Yet his failure of conceptualization is not as complete as Sax himself might believe. In a
scene that echoes his earlier quantum flowergazing experience Sax and Bao go out to look at
tundra flowers and discuss superstring theory. He once again marvels at her ability to "intuit
[the Planck] level, and then make the speculations and deductions necessary to flesh it out
and understand it," yet he realizes that there is still a lot of work to do on this theory. Sax is
experiencing a moment that combines the aesthetic (experiential) beauty of flowergazing
with the abstract terminology of physics and abruptly recognizes the dissonance this creates
in him. "[T]hey could lie side by side in the grass in the sun, staring as deeply into the petals
of a tundra flower as ever one could, and no matter what was happening at the Planck level,
in the here and now the petals glowed blue in the light with a quite mysterious power to
catch the eye" (Robinson, BM 378). What is interesting about this moment ofdissonance is
that until he begins analyzing the situation there is no problem. Once he begins thinking
about it, he is forced to reject the physics (unable to conceptualize the Planck level) in favor
of looking at flowers "here and now." Yet previouslyboth physics and aesthetics had existed
together, and evenwhen he rejects physics, time smearsawayfor him in another quantum
moment. The moment in which he looks at flowers with Bao becomes timeless and
therefore a moment ruled by a quantum physical discourse which once again fractures the
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ver>' text. A text break appears at this point in the narrative, creating a dissonance and sense
of timelessness in the text of the novel itself.
Yet bv the time his brief association with Bao comes to an end Sax has not developed a
way to come to grips with the dissonance between personal experience and abstract scientific
theories, despite having the apparently integrated example ofBao from which to draw
understanding and inspiration. Dorsa Brevia, where Bao is from, has a culture organized
around ultimogeniture, the descent and inheritance of power and property from mother to
youngest daughter. Bao's mother dies and the physicist, being theyoungest daughter, must
return to Dorsa Brevia to take control of the family. Bao is "matter-of-fact" about her
responsibility; "it was just something that had tobedone," even if it forces theentry of
uncertainty into hercareer as a physicist. "Bao wasn't sure when shewould beback [to Da
Vinci]; there was even a chance shewouldn't be" (Robinson, BM 380). In spite ot what he
knows aboutBao, Sax cannot helpbut "shak[e] his head" at howcalmly she acquiesces to
family duties overscience. Hethinks gloomily, "[Scientists] would understand the
fundamental laws of the universe before they had even the slightest handle on society. A
particularly obdurate subject of study" (Robinson, BM380). It is evident that Sax is
characteristically (scientifically) misreading Bao's fate. Can a physicist who can "intuit" the
Planck level into her experiential framework be barred from continuing scientific work away
from the confines of a laboratory? Sax was told a mere two pages earlier that Bao received
most of her mathematical training outside of institutional confines. "[Bao said,] 'My mom
gave me quadratic equations at four [yearsof age], and all kinds of math games .... Math
was mostly something I did by reading, and correspondencewith the department in Sabishii
[University]" (Robinson, BM 378). Bao is someone who lives physics, who has no trouble
living and experiencing both abstract and experiential realms simultaneously. Contrary to
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Sax's evident viewpoint, life for Bao is not either family or science but a combination of the
two.
3. The Present is All
The second of the three women whose interactions with Sax seem instrumental in
demonstrating to him the ineffectualityof his scientific viewpoint in describing or explaining
his experiential reality is Zo. She is, like Bao, a native of Mars, though unlike the
mathematician/physicist Zo has little interest in scientific matters; she is more concerned
with the pleasures of the moment (flying in a "birdsuit," and sex) and with the present
political situationwithinwhich she does work for her mother, influential Martian politician
Jackie Boone. Yet another difference, aside from the scientific, between the account of the
relationship of Sax with Bao and Sax with Zo, is that the latter account is narrated from the
point of view ofZo, providing a valuable "outside" view of the scientist from a nonscientist
and member of a younger, non-Earthbom, generation.
It is significant that, even throughZo's viewpoint, manyof the textual features present in
Sax's interaction with Bao are also present at his meeting with Zo, chiefamong them plants
and sunlight, bringing in quantum phenomena as one subtext (though Zo's experiential
paradigm is so different from Sax's that the quantum is not a point of focus in this section of
the text). Zo and Sax are introduced at Moreux Crater, where Zo's home is, and he
persuades her to take him to the bottom of the crater so he can observe the forest and marsh
biome that has been planted there. As with his walks with Bao, Sax is, at first, primarily
intrigued by the plant life and he Eisks Zo if she knows any of their names.
"The names of plants go in oneear andout the other, I'm afraid," [Zo] admitted
cheerfully.
[Sax's] forehead wrinkled at this.
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"1 think that helps me to see them better," she added.
"Really." He looked around again, as if trying it. (Robinson, BM 456)
Here Zo expresses a sentiment similar to one expressed by another of Robinson's characters.
Spiff, which appears in the epigraph to this paper, namely that knowing too much about
something actually interferes with experiencing it. This idea is apparently new to Sax who
immediately "[tries] it." As in his interaction with Bao, Sax is introduced to another
viewpoint besides the rigidly determined scientific paradigm he has held for most of his life.
But unlike Bao's example of the possibilities of integrating extremely technical and abstract
physics with her experiential reality, Zo's paradigm has little to do with science and
everything to do with fully experiencing the present moment without (supposedly) any
paradigmatic filters.
The sunlight is more evident than plants in Zo's awareness, though the light, in her mind,
is connected to the same objects to whichSax connects simlight duringhis time with Bao:
foliage and human bodies. Still, the difference betweenZo's and Sax's conception of
sunlight is profound, perhaps even mutually exclusive. "Sunlight filled the entire crater
bowl,... the air shot with parallel columns and wires of slantingyellow light" (Robinson,
BM 456-457). Where Sax conceives of and experiences the light in terms of"color
molecules" in the petals of flowers, Zo sees the light as "columns and wires," a perception
whichmarks the differences between their two conceptual paradigms: Sax focuses on a sort
of aestheticized physics of the lightandZoon its nonscientific architectural, purely aesthetic
characteristics. Their paradigms do share appreciation for the colorof reflected light: "The
longblades of grass gleamed under the lilac midday zenith" (Robinson, BM458).
Light also interactswith humanbodies. When Sax is sailingwithBao there is a brief
mention of an observation he makes concerning the interaction of the sunlight with Bao's
hair. "Lightflaked off the fineblackhairgathered at the backof Bao's neck"(Robinson,
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BM 377). This sightmakes Sax think of string spin networks and leads directly to his
realization that he can't conceptualize the Planck level as Bao cari. Zo. too. focuses on the
interaction of the sunlight, though focused onher own body. After swimming in a lake. Zo
"[lies] on the sand, feeling . . . the solar radiation cook both sides of her." ''the sunlight hot
on her exposed vulva" (Robinson. BM458. 459). Duringher sexual encounterwith Sax she
thinks of the light as "the sun's hot rain" (Robinson, BM459). This conception of the light
also contrastswith Sax's paniculate "flakes of light." for while rain is composed of
individual particles (droplets), they form a coherent whole in Zo's conception (a "rain").
Where Sax sees the light as fractured flakes which are easily dispersed. Zo sees light as rain,
the particles of which adhere as drops and come to soak every surface.
Since the scene is narrated from Zo's viewpoint there is little evidence of how Sax is
affected by the sunlight. It is interesting that he is described as wearing "round sunglasses,
hke mirrors in his face" (Robinson. BM 458) through which he observes first plants and then
lake mud. The sunglasses, which Zo clearly views as an anachronism, are interesting textual
markers of Sax's conceptual paradigm. They distance him from, and filter out. the light
whose string or particle nature makes him uncomfortable about his conceptual abilities.
They also reflect the light away from his eyes and back onto the surrounding objects he is
observing.
Despite the lack of access to Sax's consciousness in Zo's section of text, it is significant
that Sax is at this point engaged in similar activities to the ones he pursued in the section
concerning Bao. He observes first plants and then mud (both filtered through his sunglasses)
as if attempting to come to an integrated conceptual framework taking into account
macroscopic (plants, humans) and microscopic (bacteria or amoebas dwelling in the mud)
levels of life. His observed (and vocally articulated) sexual desire for Zo can be seen as the
locus of his interest in synthesizing a coherentparadigm out of several levels, the differences
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between most of these levels being visually marked: the large physical stature of the
Mars-bom native relative to the stature of the earthbom Sax; the extreme youth ofZo and the
extreme age of Sax; the biologically female and the biologically male: and even the
differences between their two paradigms, which are marked by Zo's awareness of physical
anachronisms associated with Sax.
The text ofZo's and Sax's interaction is rife with examples of the latter difference. Aside
from his sunglasses Sax wears another anachronistic device, an "old wristpad [computer]
that hung on his wrist like a manacle" (Robinson, BM 458). Freedom from the past and
tradition is something that Zo apparently prizes and her conception of Sax's wristpad as a
"manacle" is a sign of this. (Ann Claybome also refers to Sax's wrist computer as his
"manacle to spacetime," that is, what keeps him tied to the orderly universe. She makes him
take it off in order to fully experience the Martian wilderness [Robinson, BM 609]).
Zo's feelings about the older earthbom people are clearly spelled out at the end of her
interaction with Sax.
Most of the ancient ones Zo had met seemed especially bound in the tightly warped
spacetime of their values; and as the way people lived their values was in inverse
proportion to how tightly they were bound in them, the old had ended up Tartuffes to a
man,. . . hypocrites for whom she had no patience at all. She despised the old and
their precious values. (Robinson, BM 462)
The metaphor of the values of the old as "tightly warped spacetime" is telling as it parallels
Sax's and Bao's shared fascinatiori both with gravity and superstring theory. It is as ifZo
sees Sax's scientific paradigm as a constraining straitjacket which doesn't allow those who
adhere to its values the freedom to live in the present. When Sax tells Zo that he is under the
impression that all the "yoimgnatives were sociobiologists," Zo responds, "Oh no. Of
course not. We're much freer than that" (Robinson, BM 457, 458).
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But it is not only the anachronistic sunglasses and computer but anachronistic Sax
himself, both as a historical figure whom Zo has read about in schoolbooks and as an old
man whose "wizened" body marks him as having lived beyond his time, which separates
Zo's and Sax's respective conceptual paradigms. From the moment she first sees him Zo is
struck by the gravity of historicity that is attached to Sax. "[I]t was bizarre to have a figure
out of the books saying hello to her,... the dead hand of the past still there living among
them, perpetually dumbfounded by all the latest developments" (Robinson, BM455). It is
his age which Zo finds most compelling in Sax as a marker of his difference. Their sexual
interaction has many descriptive markers concerning his physical anachronism. Zo
conceives of Sax as a "farmer-tanned little bald wizened primate, like her image ofGandhi
or Homo hubilis .... [S]o ancient and small." When Sax touches her, Zo thinks of "a
,monkey's little hands on her skin, clever and knowing" (Robinson, BM 458, 459). She
decides that it's "even a bit sexy how differenf Sax is (Robinson, BM 458).
The tenor ofZo's thoughts is rife with discourses of evolutionary differences, as if she is
hyperaware that she is a new species of creature in the presence of a member of a remote
ancestral line. In fact, her thoughts are disturbingly similar to nineteenth century Western
European and American discourses about the evolution of the "white race" (the supposed
end point of evolution) which equated blacks, supposedly at the bottom of the racial
hierarchy, with apes and monkeys while at the same time circulating contrasting discourses
filled with suppressed sexual attraction to these "others." It is significant that while Sax is
also attracted to Zo because of her difference from him, he doesn't view it in the same
evolutionary terms as Zo. It seems as though he retains a bit of scientific detachment
concerning her difference. After their sexual activity. Sax and Zo discuss the physical
differences of the Martian natives.
He was looking at her body. "It's interesting how big people are getting .... Depth of
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chests have gro\vn greater, I read."
She laughed again. "The thin air, right?"
"Presumably. It's true in the Andes, anyway. The distances from spine to sternum in
Andean natives are nearly twice as large as they are in people who live at sea level."
(Robinson. BM 461)
When Zo attempts to impose her Mars-centeredevolutionary framework on the subject. Sa.\
emphatically resists. "He shook his head. 'It's phenotypic. If you raised your kids on Earth
their chests would shrink right back down'" (Robinson, BM 461). It is interesting that from
Zo's particular situated position in relation to Sax she views herself as much advanced over
him and other "old ones," especially in her freedom from the bind of values and
sociobiological and other outmoded scientific discourses. Yet clearly, she conceives of her
superiority in the terms ofjust such an outmoded scientific discourse. It is surely more than
coincidental that the section of the novel narrated from Zo's viewpoint (Part 11. "Viriditas")
is the locus point for the meeting of Sax's musings on history (the material in this section's
introduction on the historical paradigm ofCharlotte Dorsa Brevia) and his growing
awareness of the indefinite state of his memory. It is also significant that the point-of-view
character is ?. future Martian native whose conceptual and experiential paradigm is partially
composed by a historical scientific discourse.
It does seem to be through conversation with Zo that Sax first becomes aware of his
"memory problems." Zo asks Sax about what her mother Jackie, whom Sax taught as a
child, was like when she was yoimger. "Hiroughout this conversation Sax's remarks are
ambiguous and fractured. To several ofZo's questions he is forced to reply, "I don't know,"
which prompts her to respond,
"You aren't much help."
"No."
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''Forgotten it all?"
"Not all. But what I remember is-hard to characterize .... And-I remember her
cr\ing once."
"Why? And don't say I don't know!"
This balked him. Finally he looked up at her, with a smile almost human. "She was
sad.. . . Because her mother had left. Esther?"
'That's right."
"Kasei and Esther broke up, and Esther left for~I don't know.... And then she
cried."
"What did you say to her?"
''I don't. . .. Nothing, I suppose. I didn't know what to say. Hmmm . . .
(Robinson, BM 457)
This passage has features which echo those of Sax's earlier "quantum moments" during
his association with Bao. Flis answers are fragmented and inconclusive, much like his sense
of the present and the very composition of the text in the earlier passage. Flis sense of time
has become fluid and imprecise as well, even aside from his uncertain memory. This
temporal blurring is signified by how history bleeds into the present in his memory of Jackie
asking Sax about her grandfather John Boone, just as Zo now asks Sax about her mother
(Robinson, BM 457). While Sax's experience during this portion of the text may be
splintered and urmioored in time, Zo does not share this experience; the portion of the text
during which Zo and Sax take their walk in the wilderness is fluid and unbroken, even during
the description of their sexual activity. Zo's conceptual paradigm does not interfere with the
cohesionof the reality she experiences, evenwhenthat reality occurs on multiple levelsof
perception.
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Where Sax is confronted, in the figure of Bao, with an example of the possibility' of a
coherent paradigm that pulls together abstract, ordered scientific speculations and
indeterminate experiential realities (while not denying the indeterminacy a presence and
freedom within the abstract), in the character ofZo he comes up against someone whose
I^nradigrh is radically different from his, but who still has important things to say to him
about the interactions of experience, memory and history. Bao's paradigm is more closely
related to Sax's own because they share the basic discursive framework of science. Zo"s
paradigm is quite different from his, since she conceives ofMars in much different ways,
without the benefit(?) of the contemporary scientific discourses: she instead uses a
hodgepodge ofdiscourses from the past. Yet both women are perceived of, by both Sax and
by te^t, nc be^Tig "differenf from him because of their gender and their agency, their
refusal to be reduced to objects for his scientific (and aesthetic) observation.
Because this section of the novel is narrated by the ''different" Zo, the text seems to invite
the reader to compare her discursive and experiential realities with those of Sax. She
appears to be both extremely "presentist," living in the moment and for the moment, and
lacking a sophisticated and/or scientific paradigm ofher past and her experiences. Sax, on
the contrary, seems to lack an ability to (voluntarily) exist in the chaotic and indeterminate
moment and, while lacking a solid scientific paradigm that would order "the past" as history,
feels that he has a paradigm which serves him well otherwise. However, it is his lack of
ability to keep control of thepresent moment and time/memory which he begins to recognize
as the crux ofa problem he later ties to the gerontological treatments and the "anamnestic"
memory drug. The final partof his solution, and the end ofboth the trilogy andhis journey
ofexperiential revelation, are provided by his interactions late in the novel with his political
nemesis (because of her anti-terrafomiing views concerning Mars) Ann Claybome. His final
interactions with her are set up in his association withZo, whenhe asksZo to take Ann to
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Miranda. Uranus\s moon, a "moon knocked apart in an impact, and then reassembled, moon
and impactor together. It's an image I'd . . . like [Ann] to see'' (Robinson, BM 460). That
trip appears to build the foundations for the "jumping together" of Ann and himself which
Sax alludes to here, though Zo does not live to see it.
4. The Dilemma ofQuantum Memory
Sax clarifies his resolve to work on his memory problems, before his reunion and
reconciliation with Ann, while sitting on a terrace and watching the sunset with Maya. He
has just finished musing on the huge "structure" or "narthenon" of science during which he
concludes that the reality of science, a series of interlocking complex models of various
aspects of "reality" or "nature," is "more supple and various" than Thomas Kuhn'<;
paradigms ("model[s] ofmodeling") (Robinson, BM580). At this point. Sax recognizes that
the more layers of abstraction used to filter (or "model") reality, and therefore to attempt to
control that reality through the order of the "model," the less exact the accuracy of the
description of that reality becomes fCuhn's theory of paradigms, by adding a fijrrher
"model" layer to the "models" being used to describe reality, merely obstructs the
description of reality eveti further Sax realizes that in science themostbasic layer of
abstraction ismathematics, which he calls the "language of the poem [i.e., science]," used
because it "appeared to be the language of nature itself there was no other way to explain
thestartling adherence of natural phenomena tomathematical expressions of great difficultv
and subtlety" (Robinson, BM 579). Sax seems here to conveniently ignore his own earlier
observation that certain "exotic" and "beautiful" mathematical constructs, such as string spin
networks, may not necessarily adhere to any reality (Robinson, BM 372). Perhaps he has had
time to fully appreciate Bao's faith that"[sjomething sobeautiful as this has to be true"
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(Robinson, BM 376), a sentiment that at least adheres to the experience of reaiitv- rather than
multiple abstractions of it.
Despite his recognition ofmathematics as a "language," abstract signs signifying
completely different phenomena, Sax makes the usual move made by scientific discourses:
he conflates the signifying system of mathematics with the reality it supposedly signifies: .
. [I]n the end politics could not materially affect the structure [of science] itself, the
mathematical edifice of their understanding of the phenomenal world.... Science was a
social construct, but it was also and most importantly its own space, conforming to reality
only: that was its beauty. Truth is beauty, as the poet had said, speaking of science"
(Robinson, BM 581).
What Sax is admitting here is his desire to use science as a means of ordering reality. He
envi«iions science as a solid, large stony edifice with very little room for change, while at the
same time recognizing what seems to be the contrary view of science as "supple and
various " Almost within a single thought he draws science as a "social construct" that has its
own space, a space necessarily different from the "reality" it "conforms to" and conflates the
two spaces into one space: "Truth" equals "science" equals "beauty." By this construction of
science Sax papers over an indeterminate world, where the truth ofany given situation is
often hard to recognize, with a nice, neat and ordered almost-real (or "as-good-as-rear*)
space where Truth is obvious. He then accepts the almost-real space of science as "truly"
real, while repressing the real space behind the almost-real, since his science is incapable of
controlling that reality.
Having constructed this space ("edifice") for himself, within which he feels "comfortable,
capable." he nevertheless only feels "content" "on some levels" (Robinson, BM 581). He
must almost immediately venture out into the indeterminate reality hewas attempting to
shield himselffrom. The problem seems to be in how vast and slow-moving (fixed?) the
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•"edifice" is in solving large problems. "But he began to understand that as beautiful and
powerful as science was, the problem of biological senescence was perhaps too difficult.
Not too difficult to be solved ever, nothing was that, but simply too difficult to be solved in
his lifetime" (Robinson, BM 581).
Despite his repression of science's lack of flexibility and desire for ultimate control
("nothing was [too difficult to be solved]"), Sax realizes that to solve the large issue of wh\
old people are dying in spite of years of gerontological treatments, science must refine its
"understanding ofmatter, space and time" (Robinson, BM 581), problems he feels are too
large for him to do anything about. "He was only mortal after all" (Robinson, BM 582). In
other words, the edifice of science is too controlling and too fixed to be rebuilt (repaired) in
time to be useful to him.
Thoughts of his own mortality seem to make him conclude that the "problem" of death
will never be solved (in spite of his assertion just paragraphs before that nothing was "too
difficult to be solved"). Perhaps death is too indeterminate a state to ever fit comfortably
wdthin Sax's almost-real space of science. "Postponements [for death], yes; solutions, no,"
Yet, even as an indeterminate phenomenon death must be accepted within the constructed
space.
The intrusion of the indeterminate intothe neatspace of science leads Sax to a startling
realization.^ In a sentence striking for its proximity tohis assertion ofhis own mortality, he
declares toMaya, "Reality itselfismortal," a statement which neatly collapses three separate
(though stacked and interrelated) spaces into one: Sax and his personal experience of reality,
the reality ofscience (the edifice must crumble eventually), and the reality beyond the reality
of science. Maya, "absorbed in the sight ofthe sunset," fully in the ail-too mortal moment of
the senescence oflight, replies simply, "Ofcourse" (Robinson, BM 582). Sax, spurred both
by his concern for Maya's major memory troubles and by his own "blank-oats" chooses to
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focus on the "smaller" problem ofmemory-, a problem that leads him directly into the realm
of quantum indeterminacy and takes him ultimately to his complete awareness of the nature
of "the moment," of time itself.
Sax must immerse himself in the scientific literature on memory research in order to
understand the most recent theories about how memory works and where it is located in the
brain. This reading gives him some interesting information about the construction of the
brain which he had not been aware of before his research. While reviewing the history of
twentieth century attempts to discover the location ofmemory sites (so-called "engrams") in
the brain Sax comes across a description of an experiment using rats. ". .. [Vjarious parts of
rat's brains were removed after they learned a task, with no part of the brain proving
essential; the frustrated experimenters concluded that memory was 'everywhere and
nowhere'" (Robinson, BM 584). Sax understands that this "frustration" on the part of the
experimenters led to the idea (he calls it an "analogy") that the brain works like a hologram,
an idea which he considers to be "even sillier than all the other machine analogies [of brain
function]" (Robinson, BM 584).
A hologram is a photograph created by a laser beam, that beam being a particular sort of
emergent quantum system called a Bose-Einstein condensate (see Zohar and Marshall,
Chapter 3, ''A New Physics of the Mind" 65-90). The property of the hologram alluded to by
the researchers Sax is reading is that the information of the entire photograph is contained in
any and every portion ofthat photograph. That is, if a person had only one tiny section of the
photograph, that section would contain information that would enable the person to recreate
the whole photograph. This property originates in the emergent quantum nature of the laser
beam that created the hologram. One of the current theories in neurology (as described by
Zohar and Marshall) is that consciousness is, itself, evidence of the operation within the
brain of a Bose-Einstein condensate; that is, the brain functions as an emergentquantum
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system. In thismodel, consciousness, and its abilit\' to integrate varied and disparate
elements of sensual experience into a coherent whole, exists in a manner similar to the
existing properties of a hologram'; thus, memory is ''everywhereand nowhere" in the brain.
Sax, while dismissing mechanistic paradigms for brain function, cannot quite integrate
the quantum nature ofmemory, apparently confirmed by scientific experiments, with the
idea of a "hologram analogy" of brain function. He again displays signs that he cannot fully
appreciate differing levels of existence or reality. He is incapable of conceiving that the
hologram analogy may be an analogy based, not on the crude level of surface resemblances,
but rather on the idea that the brain may be an emergent quantum system, like a laser beam,
which takes a holographic photo of reality and pieces it together as "consciousness." He may
in fact feel motivated to dismiss this idea simply because it is an analogy, rather than his
preferred "homologies." While Sax is never described as consciously coming to accept the
validitv' of a "holographic" conception of the human brain, the text's description of the
quantum "weirdness" associated with people's memories of the same event, and the eventual
relationship forged by Ann and Sax, with its quantum characteristics, give evidence that the
brain, the source of human consciousness, is to be considered as quantum in nature.
Sax's research certainly shows signs that consciousness and memory are a quantum
system. He discovers that research indicates the "engram" may exist on a smaller level in the
brain than the neuron, perhaps on the level of "dimers," proteins that help create the external
structure of neurons. He notes that dimers "[exist] in two different configurations, depending
on their electrical polarization. So the dimers represented a possible on-off switch of the
hoped-for engram" (Robinson, BM 584). Yet, if this is the case, there is a problem in
relating, for example, one engram to one dimer. The dimers are "so small that the electrical
state of each dimer was influenced by the dimers around it" (Robinson, BM 584); thus each
individual dimer operates as part of a larger coherent system that potentially connects all
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parts of the brain in a common network of consciousness. This is a primary characteristic of
such Bose-Einstein condensates as superfluids and superconductors, and even Sax has to
come to the conclusion that there is something quantum going on.
. . . [C]ontained inside the dimer columns were tiny threads of water in an ordered
state, a state called vicinal water, and this vicinal water was capable of conveying
quantum-coherent oscillations for the length of the tubule....
... So now the best current model had it that memories were encoded (somehow) as
standing patterns of quantum-coherent oscillations, set up by changes in the
microtubules and their constituent parts, all working in patterns inside the neurons.
(Robinson, BM 584-585)
Quite suddenly Sax comes up against two things which gave him trouble in his conversations
with Bao: quantum indeterminacy and the interactions of different levels of reality. From the
quantum oscillations of the vicinal water at the lowest level science can yet measure to the
dimers to the neurons, all the levels are integrating into an emergent system the sum of
whose parts is greater than the whole of those parts, a true quantum system. Sax even links
the brain activities explicitly to Bao's work on quantum particles as superstrings: "some
[researchers] saw signs that the oscillations were structured in the kind of spin-network
patterns that Bao's work described, in knotted nodes and networks that Sax found eerily
reminiscentof the palace-of-memory plan" (Robinson, BM585). The "palace-of-memory,"
a memorization technique in which each item memorized is visualized as beingplaced in a
different location within a building, signifies that Sax is finally beginning to be capable of
conceptualizing the level of quantum activity in terms with which he is familiar.
So, forthe most part, this heavy-duty research Sax has been engaged in has still been set
within the almost-real, self-constructed space where he is comfortable. But the space, so
ordered and determinate in Sax's mind, begins to unravel onceSax realizes hewill have to
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deal with quantum effects. "So, not only was there simply more going on [in the brain than
researchers had thought], but it was also happening at such fine levels that quantum effects
were certainly involved. .. . [T]his meant that all the counterintuitive phenomena and sheer
paradox of quantum reality were an integral part of consciousness" (Robinson, BM 585).
Again Sax virtually contradicts his assertion that nothing is impossible for science to
discover when he decides that he is "not greatly surprised" by the appearance ofquantum
phenomena in the brain, as he had always felt that the mind was something "science could
scarcely investigate" (Robinson, BM 586)
In a paragraph whose awkwardness seems to emphasize Sax's discomfort with
indeterminacy (Robinson, BM 586) he goes back and forth between his faith in science and
his belief that science has not fiilly accepted (three hundred years after the discovery of
quantum phenomena) the implications of quantum physics. "[S]cience had learned," this
paragraph begins, that quantum phenomenawere "outrageous at the level of human senses
and ordinaryexperience." Sciencebacks up Sax's inability to bridgeconceptual levels of
reality. But then his uncertainty aboutscience's capabilities manifests itself "Theyhadhad
three hundred years to get used to [quantum phenomena], and eventually they had to
somehow incorporate this knowledge into theirworldviews, and forge on." This uncertainty
undermines the statements directly follovwng it ("Sax would have ... said that he was
comfortable with the familiar quantum paradoxes;" quantum phenomena are"at least
quantifiable") turning them into testimonials ofscience's inability toadequately deal with
these phenomena. The foundation of Sax's firm "structure" (science) is shakier than he can
explicitly (consciously?) admit, as ifthe builders ofthe hyperordered ramparts (Sax among
them) had never been forced to look into the basement (the microlevels ofreality) and see
how indeterminate and chaotic the darkness "down there" really is. Instead ofadapting that
uncertainty into their construction scheme, scientists chose to repress that knowledge. Sax,
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however. is finally coming to understand that he must deal with it in order for the building to 
continue grov.ring, let alone remain standing. 
Part of science's problem with quantum discourse is that discourse's heavily subjective 
nature, and as a quantum phenomenon, Sax realizes, memory is heavily subjective and prone 
to be influenced by lived experience. He is (paradoxically) able to accept this as part of his 
memory hypothesis because, even though science desires to retain objectivity and control, 
this particular quantum effect provides an explanation for why the brain more easily retains 
vivid memories: "Thus the emotional charge of an event had much to do with how fully it 
was laid out in the memory. Things happened, and the consciousness witnessed or 
experienced them, and inevitably a great deal of this experience changed the brain, and 
became part of it forever" (Robinson, BM 586). Reality in the memories of individuals is 
highly subjective, not subject to scientific objectivity, yet explainable by a scientific 
discourse that science itself cannot fully integrate. At very basic levels of reality, Sax begins 
to recognize, indeterminacy reigns and shapes macrolevel reality. 
Sax at last has read up on the field enough to come to some basic conclusions about 
memory loss in people whose lives have been artificially extended by the gerontological 
treatment. He concludes that senescence at the quantum level in the brain is fundamentally 
tied to entropy and the effects of chaos. " ... [A]fter about 150 years of[memory] storage, 
experiments suggested, the [memory] pattern [physically structured in the brain] began to 
degrade more and more rapidly, due apparently to the accumulated quantum effects of free 
radicals collecting randomly in the brain" (Robinson, BM 587). Sax makes an entropic 
connection to blindness: "[Senescent memory loss] was probably about as clocklike, Sax 
thought glumly, as the thermodynamic clouding of the lens of the eye" (Robinson, BM 587). 
Sax is still resistant to Spencer's "interesting cosmological notion" (Robinson, BM 3 71) that 
all order (most especially human life, the most complexly arranged order in the universe) is 
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really just differential entropic layerings of chaos. The thought of chaos makes Sax "glum," 
and his subtle conceptual intermingling of the construction of memory, from the 
only-briefly-mentioned diffuse "network," to the "ordered patterns" with which he becomes 
obsessed highlight his desire to repress and deny the chaotic nature of reality, as well as that 
chaos' s collusion with indeterminacy ("quantum effects of free radicals collecting 
randomly") in causing his own memory problems. 
This repression and denial of chaos leads Sax to a dramatic conclusion . 
. . . [T]he mind-body connection was so strong--so strong that the distinction itself was 
probably false, a vestige of Cartesian metaphysics or earlier religious views of the soul. 
Mind was one's body's life. Memory was mind. And so, by a simple transitive 
equation, memory equaled life. So that with memory gone, life was gone .. 
[People] had to remember to be truly alive. (Robinson, BM 588) 
The logic, on first examination, appears to be sound, and yet this conclusion is refuted in at 
least two places in the text in the experience of Maya Toitovna which I will examine in the 
next chapter, and in the near-death experience of Ann Clayborne in the very last section of 
the novel, which I will describe at the end of this chapter. If Sax's conclusion is incorrect, or 
at least only partially correct, where is the flaw in his logic? It would appear to be at the 
point where he conflates "memory" with "mind;" this equation underemphasizes the role of 
present experience in "living" and is a direct result of Sax's desire for order and repression of 
chaos and indeterminacy. As I have argued, Sax' s experience of the "present" moment 
becomes fractured, indeterminate and timeless at several points in the text, usually when he 
is in the Martian wilderness with a female companion examining the local flora. This 
fracturing of Sax's experience seems to be related to his realization that the women he is 
with are "other" than himself, with their own talents, ideas and conceptions of physical 
reality. They are different and, therefore, his experience of them necessarily has a large 
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indeterminate, if not chaotic, element to it. In attempting to resolve the discomfort he feels
about this. Sax attempts to take his cue from his appreciation of''nature," and to transform
the women into aesthetic objects which at once reasserts a measure of control in his
experience while appearing to make them "wild" and "beautiful" objects of appreciation.
Again suppressing his discomfort with Spencer's theory of all reality being entropic. Sax
links Bao and Zo with the living Mars he has helped create out of the dead entropic state it
was in before his arrival. Unfortunately, the suppression of the agency ofhis aestheticized
"objects" and the suppression of the reality of chaos causes his experience to fracture in ways
he cannot comprehend until his memory research. Thus the full impact of the linkage of
"women" and "planet/nature" won't be driven home to Sax until his reunion with Ann
Claybome, as I will describe in a moment. I wouldargue that Sax's emphasis on memorv',
the ordered pattern of his past experiences, in preference to his often chaotic and
indeterminate present experience causes him to overemphasize the roleof memory in being
aliveand, byovergeneralizing, thus to attempt to impose a definition of life which the text
ultimately reveals as false or incomplete.
The text does indicate that Sax finally begins to integrate and understand all the lessons
he has received about the indeterminate nature ofreality (and, contrary to his expectations,
memory) and of the value and validity of conceptual frameworks different from his rather
narrow scientific and macroscopic one. The locus moment for this integration of lessons is
thecomparison, bySaxandAnn, of a mutual memory while under the influence of the
anamnestic drug Sax has devised. The memory isofa private conversation between Sax and
Ann during their Antarctic training for the Martian colonization mission. Sax remembers,
"We sat there and Ithought we were getting on and Itook your hand but you pulled it away,
you didn't like it. Ifelt, I felt bad. We went back separately and didn't talk again like that,
in thatway, notever" (Robinson, BM 626).
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Ann. however, remembers things differently. "Yes. [I remember]. . .. But that wasn't
what happened.... It was me. I mean, I put my hand on your shoulder, I liked you, it
seemed like we might become ... but you jumped! Ha, you jumped like I had shocked you
with a cattle prod. . . . [N]o. It was you. You didn't--it wasn't your kind of thing, I figured
(Robinson, BM 627). Sax is shocked by the difference in their memories of the same event.
His memory is so clear: "He could still see in his mental theater that awkward instant,... the
whole thing clear almost word for word, move for move" (Robinson, BM 627). "But Ann's
hand /?ac/jerked away from him, a somatic memory just as solidly real, just as physical, a
kinetic event remembered in his body, in the pattern of cells for as long as he should live"
(Robinson, BM 628).
Despite the solidity ofhis memory, the fixed "pattern of [his] cells," however, he can see
that Ann is telling the truth and remembering just as solidly as he. "But there was that look
on Ann's face as she recalled the incident, that lookof someone in fiill possession of a
moment of her past, alive with the upwelling-clearly she remembered it too--and yet
remembered somethingdifferent than he had. Oneof them had to be wrong, didn't they?
Didn't they?" (Robinson, BM 627). Here iswhere Sax begins to comprehend that, although
he "would have ... said that he was comfortable with the familiar quantum paradoxes," that
he"had to somehow incorporate [quantum] knowledge into [his] worldview" (Robinson, BM
586), he has not even begun to understand and integrate the implications of quantum
memory. The "solid," "kinetic" yet differing memories of an event he shares in common
with Ann lead to this ambiguous sentence: "That one [memoiy] had to be true; they both had
to be true (Robinson, BM 628). The ambiguity ofthis statement arises from its position in
the flow ofSax s thought processes in the text. Directly before his comprehension that
Ann smemory had been assolid as his own. Sax had been thinking about another memorv
held in the "pattern of[the] cells" ofhis body, the memory ofHiroko (one ofthe First
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Hundred scientists onMars, long missing and presumed dead) pulling him to safet\- out ofa
snow storm. Although no one believes him when he relates this event, and Hiroko does not
appear again in the text to confirm that she did perform this action. Sax has aclear and vivid
memory' ofher hand tightly gripping (and bruising) his wrist. Following his recall of this
memory comes his reflections on the kinetic nature ofAnn's memory of their common event,
and then the sentence I quoted above. It is unclear whether that sentence refers to "both"
Sax's memories or to "both" Sax's and Ann's memories of the same event. 1would argue,
however, that the sentence, in truequantum fashion, refers to both aspects at the same time.
At this moment in the textSaxis fully under the influence of theanamnestic and his sense of
the flow of time is about to be fractured by his realization of the quantum nature of memor>'
(as I will describe shortly). He is about to realize how tenuous and indeterminate a thing
reality really is, and it all starts with the ambiguity of thestatement "'they both had to be
true." As Zohar and Marshall argue (41-47) a basic feature of ontology for quantum
phenomena is the (fractured) duality of the phenomenon (e.g., wave/particle). Sax's
statement, the beginning of an uncomfortably indeterminate train of thought, is such a
fractured textual phenomenon, applying equally to both his two memories and his and Ann's
memories.
Sax's recognition that there are a multiplicity of "truths" existing simultaneously, that is,
of the extremely subjective nature of"objective" reality greatly disturbs him, at first because
of the doubt it casts on his truth. .. [T]here was ... no way to be sure what had really
happened.... If he could not trust these upwelling memories to be true-if one so crucial as
this one [memory about Ann] was now cast in doubt-what then of the others? ..
(Robinson, BM 627). His moment of realization about the truth of"both" memories,
however, seems to be the shift point between his former "objective" and "ordered"
conceptual paradigm of reality and a new paradigmwhich, like the Kuhnian "models of
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modeling" composing Dorsa Brevia's telos of historico-economic epochs, is made upof a
mix of new insights and fragments of the older paradigm, such as his aesthetic appreciation
for "'present" reality and his sense of purpose for his life. At first, of course, he does not
know how to live with the implications of the new paradigm.
So that was the past. Thereand not there. Hiswhole life. If nothing was real but this
moment, Planck instant after Planck instant, an unimaginably thin membrane of
\
becoming between past and future--his life-what then was it, so thin, so without any
tangible past or future: a blaze of color. A thread of thought lost in the act of thinking.
Reality so tenuous, so barely there; was there nothing they could hold to? (Robinson.
BM 628)
Here, again while conflating "reality" and "his life" as he earlier conflated "reality" and his
own "mortality," Sax is finally consciously aware that his present (chaotic, fractured,
indeterminate) is the only "solid" thing he has to hold on to. There is no such thing as
objective memory or history, and thus no objective past and no determinate basis on which to
build a determinate future. The foundations of the almost-real scientific "reality" Sax had
earlier created have crumbled and thus his relationship with other people has changed.
During a silence in their conversation Sax experiences the nature of this change. "Awkward
instant. Another awkward instant. This was life with the other; one awkward instant after
the next. He would have to get used to it, somehow" (Robinson, BM 629). If there is
"nothing for [them] to hold to," Sax at first attempts to shoulder the responsibility for
creating a shared present by himself "He would have to get used to it." However, his
comprehension ofsubjectivity will change yet again as he realizes that the key to interacting
with the "other" is to mutuallyconstructa community from which it is possible to initiate
common action.
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The awareness that reality is subjective, different for different people, means that Sax can
no longer assume that reality (and therefore other people) are the same as he. People are
different and have different interpretations and reactions than he does, thus his recognition ot
Ann as a person '"other" than himself who possesses herown agency (just as she possesses a
different memorv' than Sax's). When Sax first finds Ann while they are both under the
influence of the anamnestic he conceives of Ann and Mars as "all intertwined" (Robinson,
BM 626), as objects to be acted upon, asmaterials with which to create an aesthetic object.
In the case of Mars Sax created a living planetwhosebreathableatmosphere (Sax's creation)
is a "blue signof their [scientists'?; humanity's?] powerand their responsibilitv*, their place
in the cosmos and their powerwithin it" (Robinson, BM626). YetAnn had never
acknowledged thatSax's arrogant and grandiose creation meant to herwhat he evidently felt
it meant for all humanity. She can only see his meddling with the original planet as a
violation, which Sax at last recognizes and tries to apologize for. "I didn't see the . . . beaut>"
until it was too late," he tells her (Robinson, BM626). Sax had assumed that if he could
only argue and push Ann far enough shewould see the "objective" truth of what he had
done; his argumentscould act upon her (a beingmade subject to his "objectivity," and
therefore lacking agency)to bring them togetheron his own objective terms (like the
metaphor, ominous in this light, ofMiranda, Uranus's moon, which Saxdiscusses with Zo:
"[a] moon knockedapart in an impact, and then reassembled, mooii and impactor together"
[Robinson, BM460]). This is the direct, contextualized end result of a philosophy of
science, like Edward 0. Wilson's, which refuses to take into account indeterminacy and
chaos: an imperialist force which robs its objects of agency and violates them.
Sax's actions toward Ann after recognizingher as an "other" reveal the extent of the
change in his understanding of her and her "other" conceptual framework. "He stepped
back. He reached out and held her hand, squeezed it hard. Then let go" (Robinson, BM
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6291 Sax first steps back providing Ann her own space, her own truth, but not far enough
for complete separation and further objectification; he can still touch her. He doesn't ''take"
her hand, but "reache[s]" out to hold it, as an equal, another person. He communicates his
joy at their reconciliation (a kinetic memory he experiences in the '^tenuous" present of her
hug: "[y]ou will remember this forever, he thought" [Robinson, BM 628]) by a kinetic
present action, a hard "squeeze" ofAnn's hand. Finally, he does not attempt to further
conquer her reason or her agency: instead he "let[s] go" of her hand. Where only moments
before Sax had desperately wished for something to "hold to," for something he could order
and therefore control, he is now able to "let go," allowing indeterminacy and perhaps
(subjective) chaos to exist in his relationship with another person. He is able to enter into a
true dialogue with an "other." which becomes the key to resolving the growing tensions
between Mars and Earth at the end ofRobinson's trilogy.
The dialogue between Sax and Ann allows them to understand, accept, and assume the
viewpoints of the other. In a public addressto the peopleof Mars and Earth,Ann takes Sax's
position (growing human populations onMars are inevitable and not entirely a bad thing)
while Sax takes Ann's position (the biospheric and"natural"statesof the planets must be
maintained as much as possible). The shock resulting from thisapparent double reversal of
the two most famous antagonists inMartian history causes a negotiation ofmore equitable
treaties between thetwo planets (see Robinson, BM 656-657). Sax, by changing his
conceptions ofscience and objective truth, is able to enter into what Zohar and Marshall call
a "quantum" relationship, one in which both Sax and Ann retain their identities as
individuals while being able to link together into an emergent quantum system through
dialogue, thus increasing their effectiveness as a social force (see Zohar and Marshall,
191 -194; they use the model ofa benzene ring, individual molecules sharing electrons in
common, asametaphor for the form and possibilities ofa quantum relationship with others).
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But at the moment in the text which opens up these newpossibilities for Sax, it is enough
for him to let Ann go, giving himself time to become acclimated to his new way of looking at
realit\-. As the remaining First Hundred are coming down from theeffects of the anamnestic,
under the watchful and caring eyes of Maya. Sax feels a great sense of peace and
accomplishment, a joy at being fully in the present moment, yet also needing to fortify
himself for the trying times ahead. He thinks drowsy thoughts; "Sleep, memory, sleep, body;
fall thankfully into the moment, and dream" (Robinson, BM 632).
5. Uneasily Fractured Subjectivity
Ann is the perfect person to help initiateSax's paradigm shift because she holds a very
nearly antithetical position to Sax on the purposeof science and the nature of reality. When
Sax is reliving his memory of the conversationwith Ann in Antarctica, he very briefly
touches on the subject of their argument on that occasion: "it's a net gain in order, he had
said, trying to explain the purpose of science; and she had said, for that you would destroy
the entire face of a planet. He remembered it" (Robinson, BM 627). Yet despite that last
little sentence, he has not remembered it until this point in the text, and then he promptly
buries it again, never mentioning it afterward. His memory of that argument provides a
telling insight into Ann's position which has been lacking throughout the entire trilogy.
When Sax argues emphatically for science as a tool against an entropic reality, as a "net
gain in order," Ann can only too clearly see that he wishes science to accomplish this by
objectifying, and removing agency from, an entire planet. Seen in this way, it is clear that
Ann's bitter fight to maintain a Mars unchanged from its condition before the arrival of
humans is not a celebration of a "dead world," an attitude which others have accused her of
holding during the course of the trilogy and which Sax attempts to combat by showing her
the "beauty" of the living planet Mars. Rather, what Ann wishes to celebrate is the
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complexiw, agency and indeterminacy ofMars in the present moment of humanit>''s
encounter with theplanet. She does not want to"order" Mars; she knows it isordered in its
0W71 way already.
It is implied in the text thatAnn'sattitudes on these subjects are influenced by her own
experience of reality from a fractured subjectivity, perhaps caused at this point in her life by
neurological problems suffered in common with many older people who have taken the
gerontological treatments. Ann's fractured subjectivity is first revealed in the text when Sax
approaches herwith the intention of f>ersuading her to participate in theanamnestic
experiment with the remaining First Hundred. As they hike in a non-terraformed
•'wilderness" area ofMars, she telis him ofher increasing awareness of her own chaotic
subjectivity.
[Ann said,] ''I've forgotten my whole self. I think there's someone else in me now. In
partway. A kind of opposite. Myshadow, or the shadowof my shadow. Seeded and
growing inside me."
"How do you mean?" Sax asked apprehensively.
"An opposite. She thinks just what I wouldn't have thought. ... I call her
Counter-Ann."
"And how would you—characterize her?""
"She is ... I don't know. Emotional. Sentimental. Stupid. Cries at the sight of a
flower. Feels that everyone is doing their best. Crap like that."
"You weren't like that before, at all?"
"No no no. It's all crap. But I feel it as though it's real. So .. . now there's Ann and
Counter-Ann. And . . . maybe a third."
"A third?"
"I think so. Something that isn't either of the other two."
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"And what do you-I mean, do you call that one anvlhing?"
'*No. She doesn't have a name. She's elusive. Younger. Fewer ideas about things,
and those ideas are—strange. Not Annor Counter-Ann. Somewhat like that Zo. did
you know her?" {Robinson, BM 610-611)
While Ann gains a great deal of understandingof the negative effects of attempting to
force an objective order on experiential reality, she is not entirely comfortable with the
apparatus that gives her that understanding, that is, her experienceof a fractured identity.
She is particularly uncomfortable with her nameless "elusive" third personality, and in the
final section of Blue Mars, narrated from Ann's perspective, the text gives some indications
that this third self is related to a traumatic personal event in her childhood. During the
session with the anamnestic, she "[n]ever once thought of Earth," in an attempt to deny
reinforcement of her memories of Earth and thus allow them to decay and be utterly
forgotten. Ann conceives of forgetting her time on Earth, essentially repressing it, as "a trick
she had gotten good at, the single-mindedness of the great refiiser, a kind of strength"
(Robinson, BM 664). The indication that she has been repressing these memories for a long
time, and that she finds empowerment through this severe repression, indicates that the event
in her past may have something to do with the forced denial of her agency over her own
body, or self Ann wishes to forget her time on Earth in order to re-consolidate her fractured
self, or rather, as she conceives of it, to become a new self "So she was a new Ann now.
Not the Counter-Ann, not even that shadowy third person who had haunted her for so long.
A new Ann." Then comes her most explicit statement of what she is attempting to forget.
"And if there was a Terran Ann still in there, cowering in a lost quantum closet of her own,
that was life" (Robinson, BM 665). The new Ann is determined not to allow her agency to
be suppressed again, to avoid having to "cower" in a "closet."
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Yet the new Ann also believes inbalance and compromise. She has come to think of her
sexual relationship with Sax as constituting a ''communal body" (Robinson, BM 663), that is,
individuals sharing bodies in a free and balanced system. Ofher memories. Ann thinks. "A
balance had to be kept. And here, now, she was the Martian Ann,... in the moment and the
only moment" (Robinson, BM 665). Ann, while helping Sax to shift his conceptual
paradigms, has also enabled herself to reach the same sort ofquantum paradigm he has. She
knows she must keep a balance between herself and others, between Mars and Earth, and
between the "tenuous" realityof the momentand the weight of the past.
Finally, in the last pages of the novel, the text reveals just howsuch an emergent quantum
outlook can benefit Ann. Ann is on the beach with the children of some friends, with Sax
and Maya nearby, when shebegins to get the symptoms of the"quick decline," the sudden
onset of death which strikes veryold peoplewhohave taken the gerontological treatment to
extend theirlifespans. One of the symptoms isa wild heart arrhythmia which Ann thinks of
in significant tenns. "Her heart pounded madly in herchest, like a child trying toget outof a
black closef (Robinson, BM669). It is the pastAnnhas been trying to forget that is killing
her, attempting to reassert its authority over her very life and to deny her agency. She
attempts to say"No," and attributes that statement to the "newAnn, no doubt, but there was
no time for that, Ann herself squeaked 'No'" (Robinson, BM 669). While the past crowds up
in her, destroying her, Ann in effect balances out its effects by focusing solelyon this
moment, the moment of her quick dechne. She"has no time" for the model of her self she
has recentlybuilt, the "new Ann," she can onlybe "Ann herself" Her intense focus on the
moment "by will alone" (Robinson, BM669) allows her to survive the quick decline, which
rapidly recedes.
So, contrary to Sax's fears when setting out to develop the memory drug, "memory [does
not necessarily] equal life" (Robinson, BM588)but it can sometimes equal death. Ann
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understands that, rather than "[having] to remember to be truly alive." she must strive to
Forget, to undermine the solidity ofthe body's memories, to fully acknowledge the
subjective, empowering, constructed nature ofmemory and balance it with living in a free,
indeterminate present moment. Her understanding allows her to escape her past and to live
free, triumphant in the moment, the final words echoing the solid beat ofher heart,
"walk[ing] over the sand toward her friends, in the wind, on Mars, on Mars, on Mars, on
Mars, on Mars" (Robinson, BM 671).
In the character and experiences ofAnn Claybome the text offers a contrast toSax s
understanding ofsubjectivity as based in memories ofthe past, both personal and collective
(i.e., histories). Ann serves asa balance in the polarity ofconceptions ofsubjectivity created
by Sax, in his pre-quantum understanding ofmemory (the massive edifice ofscience,
''memory equals life"), and Maya Toitovna whose conception ofsubjectivity is entirely based
on present experience andwho resists the urge to succumb to ossified structures ot past
memory. Ultimately, Robinson's textendorses Ann's (and Sax's) final schema for
interacting with the present moment as the only way experience of reality can remain fluid
while still maintaining enough structure in life to allow necessary political agency.
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CHAPTER 4: A CHAOS OF SELVES; MAYANS MEMORY
Late in Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars trilogy Maya Toitovna goes diving in *'the drowned
world of lost time, the cit\' she had loved so much*' (Robinson. Blue Mars 495: cited
hereafter as BM), the city of Burroughs, locus of so many of her conflicted and hazy
memories. The dikes surrounding the city had been destroyed at the end of the previous
novel during the Second Martian Rebellion against the metanational corporations of Earth,
allowing the surrounding waters of the Isidis Bay to "drown" Burroughs. Several decades
later the spot is a popular tourist site. Maya's lover Michel theorizes that the water's
preservation of the submerged cityscape could provide a convenient space for Maya to
explore her troubled memory and come to some sort of peace with her past and herself This
spatialization ofmemory, or topology of the past, allows Maya to "float... over the [cit>']
like a ghost" and spy upon events which she has been repressing for decades. At the time of
her dive, Maya appreciates the rigidity and order this experience imposes on her memories of
the past, but within a few pages she comes to recognize the conflicts her watery excavation
creates within her self/selves. Her fragmented subjectivity and her experiences of the
present, fractured by her memories, cause her to reject a rigid structuring of reality in favor
of an open-ended, indeterminate existence vWthin the present moment.
The memory/place Maya is drawn to is one which she has dwelt upon/in at several points
during her life, experiencing a certain past event with many different "selves" (she herself
expresses this idea, as I will discuss in a moment). As she floats through the water above the
city, she usesvarious topological markers, registering other significant memories, to guide
her to this particular memory site: a "sidewalk cafe." "[Maya] swam back up the length of
Canal Park. . . . Again she spotted the row of salt columns.... There beyond the columns
was a row ofbuildings. The buildings were the anchoring point for a line ofkelp.... There
had been a cafe in the front of that end building The last salt column served as a marker,
and Mayawas sure of her identification" (Robinson, BM496). It is this spatializedfrozen
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moment ofpast-time where "a hundred and twenty years later" (Robinson. BM 497) Maya
floats and remembers yet another version of an argument she had with Frank Chalmers, her
former antagonist'lover, which has proven tobea pivotal event in her life. Time (memory)
and Maya's subjectivity areentangled at the site of her conflict with, andsearch for, the
"real" Frank Chalmers, an entanglement which allows her access, earlier than anyother
character in the trilogy, to insights aboutthe relationships between a chaotic and
indeterminate present reality, memory, and subjectivity.
Thememory of the past eventwhich draws Maya back, physically andmentally, to the
site of the cafe concerns an argument she hadwith Frank Chalmersand a broken coffeecup.
In Red Mars, the first time in the trilogythis scene is narrated, the action is told from the
point-of-view of Frank. After an argument from which Frank hasstormed away, Maya tracks
him to a sidewalk cafe where he sits drinking coffee and confronts him.
"What do youmean bythis?" she said. She gestured at the table, at his own annoyed
scowl. "What is wrong now?"
He stared at his coffee cup, looked up at her, then back down at the cup. It was
impossible. A sentence was pronouncing itself in his mind, each word equally
weighted: I killed John.
"Nothing's wrong," he said. "What do you mean?" . . .
"Look," she said slowly. "I don't care what happened in the past." She stopped
speaking, and he risked a glanceat her; she was staringdown, looking inward. "What
happened in the Ares, I mean, or in Underhill. Or any of it."
.. . Did she know? Did she know what he had done . . . ? It was impossible, or she
would not have been here (would she?); but she ought to have known.
"Do you understand?" she asked.
He hadn't heard what she was referring to. He continued to stare at his coffee cup,
and suddenly she slapped it away with the back ofher hand. It clattered under a
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nearby table and broke. The white ceramic semicircle of the handle spun on the
ground. (Robinson, RM 419-420)
The tension between Frank andMaya leading up to the scene in the sidewalk cafe is linked to
a difference between Frank's conception of the"self as paralyzed and unchanging over
time, and Maya's conception of the "self as shifting radically across different temporal
contexts.
Frank Chalmers first enters the text near the beginning of the trilogy as he makes
arrangements to have his friend (and rival for theaffections ofMaya) John Boone murdered.
While listening to Johnmake "the usual Boone Inspirational Address" at thededication of
the first tent city onMars, Frank reflects that thetripto Mars, far from "changing" those who
hadgone there (as John claims in his speech), had instead made them "more like themselves
than ever, stripped [them] of habits until they were leftwith nothing but the naked raw
material of their selves" (Robinson, Red Mars 4: cited hereafter as RM). Shortly after his
endorsement of a belief in the existence of "naked, raw... selves," Frank begins preparing
themechanics of his plan for the assassination of John. Oneof the things Frank does is to
acquire a mask, "a black face studdedwith red paste gems. He put [themask] on"
(Robinson, RM 12). The purpose of the mask is to enable Frank to blend in with the
celebrants at the dedication festivities, in a word, to acquire anonymity; he recognizes that
everyone wears a mask, an insight he elaborates on a few years later in his conflict with
Maya.
Yet the mask also achieves another effect for Frank, that of hiding his true intentions (his
"naked" self) from others, especially the target of his plot, John Boone.
[John] sawChalmers approaching andwaved, recognizing him despite themask. That
was how the first hundred [scientists to land on Mars] knew each other...
"Hey, Frank," he said. "You look like you're having a good time."
"I am," Frank said through his mask. "I love cities like this, don't you? A mixed-
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species flock, It shows you what a diverse collection ofcultures Mars is." (Robinson.
RM 14)
The references to hismask reveal Frank's hyper-conscious awareness of it and the role it is
serving in his exchange with John. His awareness highlights his belief that he possesses an
essential "naked self which he needs to clothe. His remarks about the city and its mix of
cultures also gives some insight into his political motivations behind his assassination of
John and his later championingof a compromise treatybetweenEarth and Mars; he believes
that cultures, like people, have some essential identity which is nevermissing even when
being"mixed" in this particular Martian city. Significantly, John is not described as wearing
a mask, not even a mask covering his "naked" self "John's smile was easy. His eyes shifted
as he surveyed the boulevard below" (Robinson, RM 14). All Frank recognizes in John is his
"old friend," who reveals nothing ofthe malice toward other cultures Frank attributes to him.
Also, John thinks he is able to recognize that Frank is "having a good time," and thus is taken
in by Frank's material mask, or perhaps does not see the relevance of the mask, ignoring it
and accepting the nonmaterial mask Frank has used to shield himself.
The fear Frank has that others can penetrate through his masks to his core self,'and his
inability to apply his "mask theory" of identity to others, exacerbates his conflict with Maya
in the years following John's death. During his efforts to hammer out an immigration treaty
between Earth and Mars, Frank and Maya become reunited as lovers, an occurrence that
inflames his guilt over his role in the death of John, Maya's other lover. Frank translates that
guilt into rage against Maya who is "so stupid," "so easy to deceive" (Robinson, RM 361).
His rage is sparked because he cannot align his perception of her as a "real" and "insightful"
person with her apparent lack of knowledge about his role in John's death. It is shortly after
their first sexual encounter after their reunion that Frank first notices Maya's "gaze that
seem[s] so insightful." He is afraid that she can penetrate through his masks and discover his
guilt.
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[S]uddenly he felt not only naked, but exposed. He pulled the remaining sheet up over
his hip, then felt that he had given himself away. Surely she would see He
blinked returned her smile. Heknew it was a wan and crooked smile, but feeling his
face like a stiff mask over his real flesh he took comfort. No one could accurately read
emotions from facial expressions.... So he was safe. (Robinson, RM 360)
And indeed she doesn't see "right through him," sheappears to enjoy his company, to care
about him, and Frank finds this "intolerable. That it should be so easy to deceive even the
people who knew you best. . . that she should be so stupid.. . ." (Robinson, RM 361).
This insight, that Frank has essentially gotten away with murder and come up with the
object of his desire, leads to the first explicit articulation ofhis theory of identity.
How hidden the true self is, he thought, under the phenomenological mask. In realit>'
they were all actors all the time, playing their video parts, and there was no chance of
contact with the true selves inside others, not anymore; over the long years their parts
had hardened into shells and the selves inside had atrophied, or wandered off and
gotten lost. Andnow they were all hollow. (Robinson, RM 361; original emphasis)
His theory is immediately problematized by his perception of Maya. "Or maybe it wasJust
him. Because she seemed so real! ... A true self, didn't it have to be so? Didn't it? He
could hardlybelieve otherwise. A true self (Robinson, RM361). At its most basic, Frank's
rage is really despair that everyone else he knows seems to have a real self while he himself
ismerelya set of ossifiedmasks covering nothing. Without a self, like Sax's anxiety over
the lack ofan "objective" memory, he has nothing to hold to. The only thing at Frank's core
is his guilt about John's death.
In an argument shortly after Frank's realizationMaya seems to provide him with
confirmation that he is, indeed, a hollow mask. He is once again "furious at her stupidity, to
be so ignorant of him, so vulnerable to him, when it was all an act anyway" (Robinson, RM
362). Yet she seems not to be taken in at all. "She was dressed, standing at the door. She
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stopped to glare at him. . . . [H]e stood there naked before her, exposed to the full blast of
her scorn. 'You don't have any feelings, do you. I've tried, believe me, but you just--' She
shuddered, apparently unable to think ofwords vile enough to describe him. Hollow, he
wanted to say. Empty. An act" (Robinson, RM 363). Curiously, Maya's accusation that
Frank lacks feeling is echoed 120 years later during Maya's dive, except that at that time it is
Maya herself who is "numb" (Robinson, BM 496), who literally dives into the ossified past
(dead Burroughs rather than Frank's dead masks) in order to feel once more. Frank and
Maya part ways after her denunciation of his self and it is not until several months later that
they reunite once more and have the argument in the sidewalk cafe that becomes the
spatial/temporal locus for Maya's memory and subjectivity crises.
After their reunion Frank feels stifled bv the fact that Mava does not seem to have
changed, that she still seems to love him despite what Frank feels she should know about him
(his memory is quite selective, not at all the stable ordered set ofmasks he believes it to be).
It is at this point in the text that the first narration of the breaking of the coffee cup occurs,
and it is that moment of time which becomes fixed in Maya's memory (although
imperfectly) and replayed over and over while the rest of the argument, even who she was
arguing with or where exactly it happened, become nebulous. It is the past shared in
common by Maya and Frank that is the problem in this first cafe scene, a past that becomes
ossified and ordered and thus continues as a major problem for Maya's memory.
Frank's lack of response opens a space in the text for her to articulate her own theory of
subjectivity, similar to Frank's in that there is no place for a fixed self, but different in her
valence of that idea and in how she and Frank consequently read and interpret the presence
of the past in the present moment. She tells him, "You think I care.... As if I would care
more about then than now.... It was thirty years ago [that we had our first romantic
problems]. ... I am not that Maya Katarina Toitovna. I don't know her, I don't know what
she thought or felt, or whv.... It doesn't matter to me now. I have no feelins for it. Now I
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am here, and this is me'' (Robinson, RM 420). For Maya, subjectivities shift with time, do
not remain stable over years. She has enough insight to know that most of the past, because
of selective memories, is unavailable to the present self in its engagement with the current
experience, and so she places no value on the past. She "doesn't care what happened in the
past" because she cannot know what happened for certain: she accepts indeterminacy.
Frank cannot accept the out she offers him, however.
Suddenly he was afraid; they -were their pasts, they had to be or they were nothing at
all, and whatever they felt or thought or said in the present was nothing more than an
echo of the past; and so when they said what they said, how could they know what
their deeper minds were really feeling, thinking, saying? They didn't know, not really.
Relationships were for that reason utterly mysterious, they took place between two •
subconscious minds, and whatever the surface trickle thought was going on could not
be trusted to be right. Did that Maya down at the deepest level know or not know,
remember or forget...? There was no way of telling, he could never be sure.
(Robinson, RM 421, original emphasis)
Frank's line of reasoning at this point is quite similar to Sax's thinking about the solidity of
memory much later in the trilogy. Frank decides that human subjectivity is that
subjectivity's past, the order imposedon the life by memory. Anything a subjectivity does is
merelya repetitionof the past (compare this with Sax's fear that "memory equaled life:"
Robinson, BM588). There is no present, only the past and by conflatingthe two Frank
effectively paralyzes himselfwith too much order. Sax, fortunately, comes to an
understanding of subjectivity based in a quantum discourse which allows him to ft"ee himself
from the rigid detenninism of the mechanistic scientific order. That rigid order had
paralyzed Sax previous to his acceptance of a quantum paradigm by failing to conform to his
experiential reality during his quantum dissonances. Frank, in contrast to Sax's fmal
freedom from too-rigid order, no longer believes that spontaneous action, or subjective
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experience of the present moment, is possible. People are only the"habits" he had originally
claimed they had been '^stripped" of: walking, talking masks of past walking, talkingmasks.
By this over-ordering of life, relationships with otherpeople (who, because their subjectivit>'
can never be accessed even by themselves, can "never be [known] for sure*') are random,
chaotic endeavors. There is no hope in a universe dominated by guilt over the past.
Unfortunately for Maya, this conceptualization of subjectivity and memory is exactly the
trap she falls into by havingthe singlememory (or rather, multiplememories) of the
breaking coffee cup "ordered" into her selves across time. The first repetition of the coffee
cup incident in the text is sparkedby a revelation occurring late in the second volume of the
trilogy when Maya, Sax, Marina and a few others from the First Hundred meet in a park to
discuss strategies of resistance against the metanational corporations on Earth. Maya
separates herself from the group and, from a unique architectural point in the park which
allows her to hear what the others are saying from across a pond, she hears Marina say,
"Frank. ... If he hadn't killed John none of this would have happened" (Robinson, Green
Mars 374; cited hereafter as GM). This statement severely upsets Maya, who flees from the
park to her home. Although certain comments she made to Frank at the sidewalk cafe might
be construed as meaning she knew full well that Frank killed John, and had forgiven him for
it, the Maya at this present moment nearly fifty years later is a different Maya from that past
one. The present Maya clearly did not know, or did not remember that she had ever known,
that Frank had been instrumental in John's assassination.
Maya stands in front of her mirror, examines the "nauseating image" of her aged face and
begins to perform an archaeological exploration ofjust what she does remember about
Frank. Just as in her dive in Blue Mars she conceives of retrieving her memories as digging
up the past, an image of spatialized and stratified memories accumulated in layers, similar to
Frank's conception of the past and subjectivity as layers ofmasks. "When she put her mind
to it, and forced herself to remember, to recollect, it was frightening how little came up.
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Fragments: moments: potsherds of an entire civilization" (Robinson, GM 375, original
emphasis). She can only remember a brief flash of significance. "Once she had been so
angry' she had knocked a coffee cup off a table, the broken handle bare like a half-eaten bagel
on a table. But where had that been, and when, and with whom? She couldn't be sure!"
(Robinson, GM 375). What is interesting about this particular memory is that it runs
contrary to the scene as it was recorded in Red Mars from Frank's point of view. In the first
scene the handle of the cup comes to rest beneath another table, while in this version of
Maya's memory it lies on top of a table. Given Sax's research into quantum memory (still
nearly 800 pages farther along in the text) it could be argued that what is going on is merely
the quantum differences between two different subjectivities' memories of a single event.
However, the implications ofMaya's original articulation of a theory of subjectivity
combined with her final version of this memory given in Blue Mars (which differs again
from the first two as I will describe in ,amoment) go further into the implications of an'
indeterminate quantum' memory than even Sax will realize. Given that subjectivities of a
single person can differ across time, then not only can a single event happen differently for
two people, but differently for one person as well, depending upon who she is at any given
moment in time. Quantum memory at this juncture in Robinson's text becomes able to
accommodate poststructuralist notions of fractured identities and provides a theoretical
framework for those identities' conditions within varying temporal contexts; that is, it
theorizes how identities are fractured not just at any given moment of time, but across any
several moments of time.
Ironically, however, because Maya is a different Maya than she was when the cup first
broke, she cannot remember what she said in that moment about the constitution of differing
subjectivities in different times. When she looks at herself in the mirror, she can't recognize
herself, only a "haggard antediluvian face ... with its pathetic reptile pain. So ugly. And
once upon a time she had been a beauty, she had been proud of that" (Robinson, GM 375;
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orieinal emphasis). By forgetting she is different selves at different times, and realizing that
she cannot remember much ofanything, Maya falls back on Frank s conception ofthe past as
the self Because she cannot "be sure" ofher past, she can no longer recognize herself or
find validation inwhat shedoes see. She becomes an"ugly" reptile, a mask which covers
her true past as a"beauty," ifonly she could dig up the pertinent "potsherds' so as to
reconstruct and order as much ofher past/self as she can. In order to perform this excavation
shedecides to search outwho the "real" Frank Chalmers was, thinking that if shecan be
sure" if he killed John ornot, then the past really will besolid and she can have something
on which to pin her subjectivity. She is supported in her endeavor by Michel, her lover and
therapist who is very concerned about the various memory problems Maya is experiencing.
Michel's beliefin the fundamental importance ofmemory inhuman life arises from his own
Proustian attachment to anobjective ordered past-through-memory which most likely
becomes responsible for his death.
Maya does text-based homework (similar to Sax's research into the first Martian
Rebellion earlier in GreenMars') on the history of Frank and the assassination of John Boone,
and like Sax, she comes to theconclusion thathistory is far too chaotic a subject to be useful
to her in ordering her own present; there are simply toomany theories purporting to bethe
truth ofwhat really happened in the past. While performing this research, and working for a
small hydrological company, hermemory problems become much more severe The
problems consist of two basic experiential phenomena; deja vus inwhich "every single event
of [the] day felt like something that had happened before" (Robinson, GM 410), and jamais
vus, "occasional momentswhen ... she was struckby the sense that nothing like this had
ever happened ever, even though she might bedoing something like stepping onto a tram'
(Robinson, GM 412). Thedichotomy between these two extremes of experience, one
experience which is overdetermined andonewhich is too chaotic, make Maya
uncomfortable. While thejamais vus are experiences that parallel the sortof reality Sax
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fears and. through most of the trilogy, chooses to overcompensate against using science as a
stronghold of order, thedejavus (the experiences that give Maya themost trouble) are the
same sort of experience of reality that Frank came to have by the time of the argument in the
cafe. Maya conceives of these events as making "the world [become] an acute frightful
prison, and shenothing more than a creature of fate, a clockwork mechanism unable to do
anything that she had notdone before in some forgotten past. Once, when it lasted almost a
week she was almost paralyzedby it" (Robinson, GM411-412). This overdeterminate
reality is similarto one which might conceivably result from a mechanistic paradigm like
Edward O. Wilson's taken to (logical) extremes.
The only things that helpMaya livewith these problems are her work,"a sort of gigantic
treasure hunt. . . [requiring education] in the secret habits of subrriartian water" (Robinson,
GM 412), and her interviews of other people who were in the city where and when John was
killed. When she asks SpencerwhetherFrank had something to do with John's murder, this
man who "surprised" Sax with his theory on entropy replies insightfully, "Does it matter
anymore?" (Robinson, GM 393). While this answer may not help the present Mayawho is
making the inquiry, it echoes her former theory of subjectivity ("I don't care what happened
in the past"). (The character Spencer highlights a problem in Robinson's trilogy, namely the
lack of point-of-view subjectivities of groupsother than white men and women. In these
texts all differences and their effects are elided into the differences between Earth-bom and
Mars-bom subjectivities, in order to create a "Utopian" society where external markers of
difference are allegedly meaningless. It is quite possible that Spencer's ethnic subjectivity,
African-American, might provide insights into the conception of quantum subjectivities, but
the text does not allow those insights).
At last, Maya interviews Zeyk, who "has the opposite problem to everyone else [i.e.,
people who have undergone the gerontological treatment].... He remembers too much"
(Robinson, GM 425). The information he gives her, that there were definite links between
the men who killed John Boone and Frank, convinces her of Frank's guilt. She feels that this
information also implicates her; she feels guilt for being the motivating cause of Frank's
jealousy (she loved John) and therefore driving him to kill his former friend. Unlike Frank.
Maya does not allow her guilt to ossify into a masked subjectivity. She begins to
subconsciously reacquire her former conceptualization of the self as changing across time.
About Frank's agency in John's murder, she says, "Some things you must forget" (Robinson,
GM 427). Like Ann Claybome's experiences, Maya's memory problems have brought her to
the realization that, contrary to Sax's or Frank's view that a person must objectively
remember everything exactly how it happened in order to be alive, forgetting is essential in
certain situations. During her historical research, Maya acquires a photograph of Frank at
twenty-three years of age, which she hangs next to the sink so she can look at it ever\' day
while doing the dishes or cleaning the kitchen with Michel, "everything habitual, everything
known, deep in that deja vu that one determines oneself, that makes one happy" (Robinson.
GM 413) (notice, though, that in conceptualizing ofnecessary deja vus, Maya uses the
impersonal "one," suggesting the distanced objectivitywhich characterizes Sax's language
prior to his first quantum moment). After her acknowledgment of Frank's guilt and her
decision to forget certain things, "the photo became little more than part of the decor. . . .
Part of the stage set for this act of the play, as she sometimes thoughtof it, which however
permanent it seemed would be struck at some point—would disappear utterly, as all the
previous sets had disappeared while she passed through to the next reincarnation. Or not"
(Robinson, GM429). The photoof Frank, a representation of a self static in time, is the
focal point for Maya's return to a variant ofher original articulation of.subjectivity. The very
fact of the photo's impermanence is symptomatic of thepresence of change in the world,
change like that she has previously lived through on her wayto a new self, or
"reincarnation," although she also admits that even change isnot necessarily a certainty.
89
Maya begins her dive in Blue Mars with the intention ofonce more reclaiming her past as
anobjective material object: she has not consciously re-leamed herconception of
time-fractured subjectivities, only experienced it. But the process of comprehension is
forced upon her during the dive by her differing memories, once more, of the broken coffee
cup and the implications these indeterminate memories have for an objective past. As she
floats above the sidewalk cafe she attempts to remember her argumentwith Frank.
She had ... found him here hunched over a coffee. Yes. She had confronted him and
theyhadarguedright there, she hadberated him for not hurrying up to Sheffield ...
she had knocked a coffeecupoff the table, and the handle hadbroken off and spun on
theground. Frank got upandthey walked away arguing, andwent back to Sheffield.
But no, no. That wasn't how it had been. They had quaneJed, yes, but then made up.
Frank had reached across the table and held her hand....
One or the other. But which had it been?
She couldn't remember. Couldn't be sure. ... It was all blurring together in her
mind, into vague impressions, disconnected moments. The past disappearing entirely.
(Robinson, BM 496-497)
The past is being replaced by present feelings, hernumbness from a recent life dominated by
the past (either too ordered, or activelyrepressed) is givingway to painful experiences in the
present moment, an occurrence she views as a good sign. "Ah but there it was, that pinprick
pain, there inside, encysted—insisted-hold on to it forever, holdon to any feeling you can,
any feeling you can dredge up out of all that muck, anything! Anythingbut the numbness;
sobbing in pain was rapture compared to that" (Robinson, BM497).
Rather than attempt to "encyst" the past in its entirety,Maya realizes it is the feelings of
those memories which matter in the present. Her memories by themselves have only made
her numb; it took a dive deep into the past and a specific memory to make her feel alive;
rather than the rigidly imposed order of the past she experiences the indeterminate
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embodiment of the present. When she attempts to add more memories to her present, she
has to stop. The attempt detaches her from her''self" "Ah-too much to feel. One could
only stand a single shard of the past at a time; this drowned city. . . Maya makes a slight
change in her desire for a determinate past; she will concentrate on embodying the past in the
present as feelings. "[S]he would have to work on that. Encyst them all, precious stabs of
feeling held in her forever, till death did they part" (Robinson, BM 497). Maya, as the last
phrase indicates, marries the past to the present in an ever-shifting, indeterminate
relationship which somehow allows her to experience the reality around and within her more
fully. As she rises to the surface, she is aware of aesthetic (visual, light-based) phenomena in
the sea;
Up, up, up, among the colorful tropical fish with their arms and their legs, back into
the light of day, blue sunlight, ah God yes.. .. [T]he rapture of human depth, the way
they lived and lived, giants plunged through the years, yes, and what they held on to.
Michel was swimming up from below;... she kicked then waited, waited, clasped him
and squeezed hard, ah, how she loved the other's solidity in her arms, that proof of
reality. (Robinson, BM 497)
In the present of this moment, Maya understands that it is what a person feels in the present,
not the sunken, dead, ossified layers of their memories, that allows them to interact with
reality. It is also significant that her action ("squeezed hard") and her choice ofwords C'the
other") echo Sax's action and thought in his present moment with Ann when he recognizes
the quantum nature of the present's slippery relationship with the past.
This liberation ofher self, from needing a constant determined memory as well as fi*om
unity across time, eventually causes her friends, and especiallyMichel, a lot of pain. Most of
the characters in the trilogy cannot conceive of the self and memory as Maya has re-leamed
to conceive ofthem. For Michel, the past of his life in Provence and his memories of that
life, are all that he had to cling to for several decades after he came to Mars. In some
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respects, they made him miserable since he longed for the Provence of hi<; memor\- rather
than the Mars that he was currently experiencing. Michel conceives ot i.,e past as essential
to life, and thus as the trilogy goes on he becomes more and more concerned aboutMaya's
memory troubles. To her repertoire of "pathologies" is added the experienceof presque vus,
in which everything she experiencesbecomes more vivid and imbuedwith significance, as if
the answer to everything were about to be revealed to her, but is always just withheld.
Things eventually come to a head while Michel, Maya, Sax and Nadia are looking at
pictures, little fixatives ofmemory. They come across the photo Maya had found decades
before of the young Frank Chalmers.
[Maya] stopped at the kitchen table, put her hand on Michel's shoulder, and looked
over it at a grainy black-and-white photo, stained by what looked like spots of
spaghetti sauce and coffee. A faded picture of a young man grinning right at the
camera, grinning with a confident knowing smile.
"What an interesting face," she said.
Under her hand Michel stiffened. Nadia had a stricken look. Maya knew she had
said something wrong, even Sax looked somehow pinched, almost distraught. Maya
stared at the young man in the photo, stared and stared. Nothing came to her.
{Robinson, BM 556)
Maya, decades before, had been so intimately tied to Frank as a living person, and then as a
discursive historical entity, that her friends are thoroughly alarmed by her lack of recognition
of Frank's photograph. They view the self as continuous across time, with the key to that
continuity being the self s memories, and the photo is emblematic of that unfractured
seiCmemory. Yet, this particular photo is the same one Maya connects with the "things you
must forgef in order to move on to the next "reincarnation." Her present self is no longer
dependent on knowing who Frank Chalmers was, or on her former selfs search for the "real"
Frank Chalmers; she knows very well that there is no such thing. She has become
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increasingly wedded to thepresent, but the reactions of her friends, and especially Michel,
upset her into leaving the apartment.
Sitting in a park, she remembers her first view ofMars from theAres, pristine, before
humanity changed the face of the planet forever. Mars had been a "'symbol of every potential
happiness. She hadnever been happier than [at] that [moment], in all thetimesince"
(Robinson, BM 557). Then, the presque vu returns and gives her one final insight that
completes her transformation from a person dependent onmemory to one who fully
encounters and experiences reality.
And then the feeling came on her again,... a vast significance suffusingeverything,
immanent everywhere but just beyond reach . . .-and with a little pop she got it--that
that very aspect of the phenomenon was itself the meaning—that the significance of
everything always layjust out of reach, in the future, tuggingthem forward-that in
special moments one felt this tidal tug ofbecoming as a sensation of sharp happy
anticipation, as she had when looking down onMars from the Arex, the unconscious
mind filled not with the detritus of a dead past but with the unforeseeable possibilities
of the live future, ah, yes-anything could happen, anything, anything. And so as the
presque vuwashed slowly away fi'om her, unseen again and yet somehow this time
comprehended, she sat back on the bench, full and glowing; here she was, after all, and
the potential for happiness would always be in her. (Robinson, BM 557)
The conclusion Maya finally arrives at stronglyresembles Sax's realization about time a few
pages later during his experience under the anamnestic drug. Maya understands that the
present is a tenuous moment caught between dead order and potential life through
indeterminacy ("anything could happen"). Yet Maya takes this conclusion farther than Sax
ever would. For the entire trilogy, since John died in the opening pages, she has been trying
to escape from being drowned in her past and in her guilt over what has happened in the past.
Now, in direct opposition to Frank, Michel and Sax, she equates the past not with life, but
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death: "in special moments ... the unconscious mind [was] filled not with the detritus ot a
dead past butwith the unforeseeable possibilities of the live future" (Robinson. BM 557).
She gladly chooses to throw in her lotwith the intersection of the present moment and the
always-becoming potential of the future.
When Maya appears in the remainder of the trilogy, she is calm, happy, engaged in the
aesthetics of a present sunset, or playing with children. Her mood swings have gone and she
appears to finally be content. The others in the trilogy do not have the capacity to understand
this change in Maya. Michel is killed outright byhis shock over her lackof recognition of
Frank's photo. Sax, whoalongwithAnn will eventually come closest to understanding her
viewpoint, is inspiredbyMaya's problems to develop his anamnestic drug. Part of his
determination comes from his conviction that "memory equals life. So that with memoiy
gone, life was gone. SoMichel must have felt, in that final traumatic half hour, as his self
tumbled into a fatal arrhythmia, under the anguish of grieving for his love's death-of-mind"
(Robinson, BM 588). Robinson's text reveals that Sax is wrong on every count; Maya's
mind has not died, nor has she herself died firom lack of memory. Michel's problem was not
Maya's self, but his own past-drenched self "tumbl[ing] into .. . arrhythmia." Despite his
inabilityto understand Maya, the text charts the beginning of a change in Sax's conception of
her. For example. Sax feels it necessary to defendMayawhenAnn laughs at her and tells
him, "Maya is crazy." "'Why no,' Sax said sharply. 'She certainly is not'" (Robinson, BM
614). It will take their experience of quantum memory to revea! to Sax and Ann just how
sane Maya is.
While Maya's epiphany of selves brings her contentment, it does cripple her in one
important way. Where she had played a major role in political actions before her memory
problems became severe, with no past to rely upon she is no longer capable of being an
effective political force. In the third confi^ontation with Earth, where Sax and Ann publicly
speak for each others' political positions concerninghuman terraforming and settlement of
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Mars, Mava can only stand with them in support. By rejecting all order in favor of
indeterminacy she has paralyzed herself politically, much as Frank's earlier rejection of
chaos and indeterminacy paralyzed him at the level ofhis subjectivity. In theend the text
seems to value a sort of balanced homeostasis between past, present and future, recognizing
partial order and partial indeterminacy in each ofthe three temporal contexts, mediated by
quantum discourses anda willingness to engage reality in a partial way.
Yet Maya iscontent. Robinson's text shows that it is possible to live without reference to
the stifling order Wilson advocates through his philosophy of consilience, or even by
validating the unknowns and uncertainties of life through alternate scientific discourses. I
would like to address Wilson using a paraphrase of his own patronizing comment addressed
toMichel Foucault, the poststructuralist philosopher of discursive power/knowledge (see
Wilson 43). ToWilson, 1would say, it's notso bad. Once we get used to the inevitable
presence of chaos and indeterminacy in life, and learn to interact meaningfully with them
experientially, rather than distancing ourselves from them by building edifices oforder, our
many selves will discover that reality canbe richer and more satisfying than anything your
illusive holistic mechanism could account for. We'll at last have a fractured science whose
discursive space can include both order and uncertainty, a science for every subjectivity.
Robinson's Maratrilogy argues fora balance between the extremes ofWilson's rigidly
overdetermined mechanistic paradigm of scientific control over reality, andMaya's
immersion within the completely chaotic and indeterminate present moment. Thisbalance is
exemplified in the relationship of Ann and Sax, a quantum relationship which allows them to
forge their ownagency and increases the effects of that agency through maintaining a
homeostatic relation between the indeterminacyof the moment and the order of the past. In
Robinson's text, quantumdiscourses are more effectivein helping individuals relate to
experiential reality than Wilson's mechanistic paradigm primarily becausequantum
discourses allow for indeterminacy and chaotic effects rather than repressing them. The
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Mars trilogy argues forcefully for a subjectivity's full engagement in experiential realit>',
rather than in a constructed "model" of that reality, as the best way to interact with the
universe and attain satisfaction andpeace. The text's argument seems to shut the door on
Wilson's fears about chaos and the indeterminate universe by showing that accepting these
phenomena, and learning to live with them, improve science, people's lives, and the
interrelation between the two.
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